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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The upturn in the Euro Area that was noted in our Autumn Report of 2006 
continued in the second half of 2006. The slower growth in the third quarter 
that followed the strong rise in output in the first half of the year proved to be 
temporary. In the fourth quarter real GDP growth rebounded to a quarterly 
rate of 0.9 per cent. This brought GDP growth to 2.8 per cent in 2006 on a 
working day adjusted basis (2.6 per cent unadjusted), slightly above the forecast 
made by EUROFRAME-EFN in the Autumn report. In the fourth quarter 
output was 3.3 per cent higher than a year earlier, which is the best 
performance since 2001. 
 
The economic expansion is broadly based with both domestic demand and the 
external sector having contributed substantially to growth in the second half of 
2006. The upturn was clearly visible in the labour market. Employment grew at 
an annualised rate of around 1.5 per cent throughout the year, up from annual 
growth of 0.8 per cent in 2005. The unemployment rate continued to decline 
and was down to 7.4 per cent in January 2007, from 8.3 per cent in January 
2006 and 8.9 per cent at the peak reached in March 2004. Annual inflation as 
measured by the HICP fell to only 1.6 per cent in October, down from 2.5 per 
cent in Spring mainly reflecting the drop in oil prices. Since then the rate of 
inflation has increased slightly albeit remaining below 2 per cent. 
 
Weaker US growth, an appreciation of the euro, tighter monetary policy and 
restrictive budgetary policies set the context for our forecasts. We expect a 
continuation of the economic expansion in the Euro Area with real GDP 
growth slowing down only gradually to 2.5 per cent and 2.2 per cent, 
respectively, this year and next.  The moderation of output growth is due 
mainly to a deceleration in export growth. We expect exports to grow by 6.2 
percent in 2007 and by 5.1 percent in 2008, down from the 2006 figure of 8.1 
percent. This reflects a slower expansion of export markets and a deterioration 
of price competitiveness as a result of a higher external value of the euro.  
 
Domestic demand is projected to continue expanding at an almost unchanged 
pace of around 2.5 per cent in both 2007 and 2008. Within domestic demand, 
private consumption is likely to strengthen and to grow by 2.1 percent in 2007 
and by 2.3 percent in 2008. These increases will be driven by further 
improvements in the labour market and a stronger rise in real disposable 
incomes. Private investment which had been the main driver of domestic 
demand last year is forecast to increase by another 5 per cent this year 
supported by strong demand for increasing capacities and on-going favourable 
financing conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Summary of Key Forecast Indicators for Euro Area 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
        
Output Growth Rate  0.9 0.8 1.8 1.5 2.8 2.5 2.2 
Inflation Rate 
(Harmonised) 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.8 2.0 
Unemployment Rate  8.2 8.7 8.8 8.6 7.8 7.2 6.8 
Govt. balance as % of GDP  -2.5 -3.1 -2.8 -2.4 -1.8 -1.2 -1.0 
        
 
Next year, we expect somewhat slower investment growth (just under 4 
percent) as profitability should decline, but to some extent this is also due to 
the effects of changes in depreciation rules in Germany. Imports will decelerate 
slightly; they are forecast to grow by 6.1 percent in both 2007 and 2008, down 
from 7.5 percent in 2006. This reflects the import content of diminishing 
export growth. The Euro Area-wide current account is forecast to remain in a 
marginal deficit position over the forecast horizon as the reduction in real net 
exports is more or less balanced by gains in the terms of trade. 
 
A number of assumptions underlie the forecasts. Oil prices (based on an 
average of Brent and Dubai prices) are assumed to average US$58 per barrel in 
2007 and US$60 per barrel in 2008. These levels represent falls relative to the 
2006 average of US$63 and are thought likely as a result of a lower pace of 
global expansion. The lower oil price will have the effect of reducing inflation 
globally.  Within the Euro Area, we expect inflation to fall to 1.8 percent in 
2007 despite the upward impact of the German VAT rise, before rising again 
to 2 percent in 2008. It is assumed that the dollar/euro exchange rate will be 
1.35 at the end of 2007 and 1.40 at the end of 2008. These movements are 
thought likely based on the likely movements in interest rates in the US and the 
Euro Area. It is assumed that short-term interest rates in the Euro Area will be 
4.1 percent at the end of 2007 and 2008. For the US, short-term interest rates 
are assumed to fall from their current level of 5.3 percent to 4.8 percent by the 
end of 2007 and down further to 4.5 percent by the end of 2008. This is 
expected to result from the reaction of the Federal Reserve to a fall in inflation 
in the US. 
 
The world economy is projected to perform well in 2007 and 2008, lengthening 
the already exceptionally long period of robust growth. However, housing 
market problems will cause US economic growth to drop below potential, to 
2.4 percent in 2007 and 2.3 percent in 2008. This lower rate of US growth will 
have ripple effects in neighbouring countries and the rest of the world. As a 
consequence, global economic growth is projected to taper off from a record 
high of 5.3% in 2006 to 4.5% in 2008, while projected world trade growth 
softens from 9.0% in 2006 to 6.2% in 2008. Emerging Asia, benefiting from 
the changing global division of labour, will remain the most dynamic region. 
China alone is likely to account for almost a third of global economic growth in 
the projection period.  
 
A distinctive feature of last year’s upturn has been the change in the regional 
distribution of Euro Area growth. In particular Germany, which had 
consistently and substantially underperformed the Euro Area average since the 
inception of the common currency, has closed the gap in 2006 as regards the 
annual average growth rate. We expect that the German recovery will be 
sustained in 2007 and that the German economy will grow in line with the 
Euro Area average over the forecast horizon.  
 
The French economy on the other hand has lost ground in the past couple of 
years relative to the Euro Area average. After growing at around average 
growth rates, or slightly above, in the first years since the inception of the Euro 
Area, real GDP increased slightly less than the Euro Area total in 2005. In 
2006, the growth gap widened further to a negative 0.7/0.8 percentage points. 
The gap is expected to fall in 2007 and 2008, with France growing by 0.3 and 
0.2 percentage points below the Euro Area average in 2007 and 2008 
respectively. 
 
For Italy, the growth rate of 1.9 percent last year represents a sharp 
improvement from almost stagnation in 2005. This mainly reflects an 
improvement in industry that seems to have moved beyond a low-point after a 
prolonged period of adjustment to a loss in price competitiveness and 
increased competition from low-cost countries. We expect Italian industry to 
continue to contribute to economic growth both this year and next.  
 
The main risks to the forecast concern oil prices, the huge global current 
account imbalances and rising wages in Europe. A simulation is run using the 
NiGEM model in which expected inflation is increased in Germany by 1 
percent for 12 quarters, thereby raising wages. The main impact is on 
unemployment, which is about 0.2 percentage points higher after three years. 
Analyses of potential sources of adjustment in the US to its current account 
deficit, again using NiGEM, show how the impact on the Euro Area differs 
when the source is domestic to the US (such as a house price fall) or 
international (such as an exchange rate risk premium change). An analysis is 
also undertaken of the routes through which interest rate increases in the Euro 
Area impact upon the economy. The results point to the relative importance of 
exchange rate movements in response to interest rate changes in reducing 
inflation. 
 
We expect that the ECB will raise rates further in the near future. The key 
interest rate will reach 4 percent in the summer and remain there until the end 
of 2008. This projection is supported by our estimation of a forward looking 
Taylor rule. At a level of 4 percent, the key interest rate will be lower than at 
the peak of the previous interest rate cycle. In 2000, the key rate was raised to 
4.75 percent. We do not expect such a high rate for several reasons. First, the 
previous economic boom was stronger than we anticipate today, so the output 
gap was considerably higher at that time. Second, most estimates suggest that 
the steady state risk free real interest rate is currently lower than at the 
beginning of this decade. 
 
The fiscal stance has been contractionary at the Euro Area level over the last 
years, mainly in countries running deficits. We expect the Euro Area fiscal 
stance to remain slightly contractionary in 2007 and 2008 albeit to a smaller 
extent. The general pattern of countries running deficits implementing fiscal 
contraction in order to meet the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact will 
remain, perhaps with the exception of France, ahead of general elections this 
year. Fiscal policies will remain neutral in general or slightly expansionary in 
countries running surpluses. 
 
In the special policy topic of the report, the relationship between growth, 
employment and unemployment is explored. A numbers of themes emerge, 
including the following: 
 
• Over the past decade, the trend increase in unemployment has been 
arrested in the Euro Area. Labour market performance has improved 
significantly for older workers and for women (due to more part-time 
jobs), but not for younger people and the low skilled. 
 
• This picture masks large differences across countries. Fast growing 
economies were able to reduce unemployment rates rapidly during the 
last decade, in particular Ireland, Spain, Scandinavia and the United 
Kingdom. Unemployment in Germany and France, on the other hand, 
remained stubbornly high.  
 
• In a panel study of 15 EU countries, the effect of GDP growth on the 
evolution of employment and unemployment was investigated.  Over 
the period 1995 to 2005, about two- thirds of the variation in 
employment can be explained by economic growth. The effect of 
economic growth on the evolution of unemployment rates was also 
highly significant for the period 1995 to 2005, with 50 per cent of the 
variation in unemployment rates being explained by economic growth. 
As a result, it may be expected that the Lisbon strategies to increase 
economic growth (R&D, education etc.) will also help to reduce 
unemployment, together with necessary labour market reforms which 
remove barriers to employment and raise production without 
inflationary pressures.  
 
• In the context of immigration, simulations using NiGEM for the UK 
suggest that a gradual rise in the labour force of ¾ per cent over 2-3 
years leads to a temporary increase in unemployment of ¼ percentage 
point for a few years, with unemployment gradually disappearing as/if 
wages adjust.  
 
• Increasing the employment-intensity of growth cannot be considered 
as a useful long-run strategy since it is the flip-side of poor 
productivity growth. However, temporary employment-intensive 
growth, induced by social security or other structural reforms, is 
welfare enhancing if it reduces structural unemployment.  
1. OUTLOOK FOR THE 
EURO AREA 
The world economy is projected to perform well in 2007 and 2008, 
lengthening the already exceptionally long period of robust growth. However, 
housing market problems will contribute to US economic growth dropping 
below potential, with ripple effects in neighbouring countries and the rest of 
the world. As a consequence, global economic growth is projected to taper off 
from a high of 5.3% in 2006 to 4.4% in 2008, while projected world trade 
growth softens from 9.0% in 2006 to 6.1% in 2008. Emerging Asia, benefiting 
from the changing global division of labour, will remain the most dynamic 
region. China alone is likely to account for almost a third of global economic 
growth in the projection period. With global growth moderating, oil prices 
should drop somewhat from the record high of 2006 and inflation is projected 
to come down. A drop in US inflation is likely to lead to rate cuts by the 
Federal Reserve. However, the ECB is projected to raise its policy rate further. 
1.1 
Overview 
 
Table 1.1: Summary of Key Forecast Indicators for the Euro Area 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
        
Output Growth Rate  0.9 0.8 1.8 1.5 2.8 2.5 2.2 
Inflation Rate 
(Harmonised) 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.8 2.0 
Unemployment Rate  8.2 8.7 8.8 8.6 7.8 7.2 6.8 
Govt. balance as % of GDP  -2.5 -3.1 -2.8 -2.4 -1.8 -1.2 -1.0 
        
 
Despite somewhat less favourable international conditions and a restrictive 
budgetary policy in the biggest member state, GDP growth in the Euro Area is 
projected to remain above potential. Last year, GDP growth accelerated 
strongly to 2.8%1, well above its potential growth rate for the first time since 
2000. Growth was led by exports and business investment. Due to strong 
competitiveness, German economic growth was, for the first time in more 
than a decade, above the Euro Area average. 
Weaker US growth, the appreciation of the euro, tighter monetary policy and 
restrictive budgetary policies are projected to cause economic growth in the 
Euro Area to fall to 2.5% in 2007 and to 2.2% in 2008. Nevertheless, 
unemployment is projected to drop further, while government deficits will 
decline. The output gap is close to zero at the end of the projection period, 
indicating that the current upswing is relatively moderate. Table 1.2 compares 
the current EUROFRAME-EFN forecast for GDP growth in major regions 
with the autumn forecast of last year. The outcome for world growth in 2006 
                                                 
1 Working day adjusted. Unadjusted, GDP was up 2.6%.  
1 
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was slightly stronger than projected six months ago. This reflects stronger 
growth in the Euro Area as well as in the emerging economies. While the 2007 
outlook for North America is weaker than projected in our autumn forecast, 
this is more than offset by stronger growth in the Euro Area and in Asia, 
especially in China.  
Table 1.2: GDP Growth Forecasts in Autumn 2006 and Spring 2007 
  World OECD NAFTA Euro Area China 
  Autumn Spring Autumn Spring Autumn Spring Autumn Spring Autumn Spring 
2006 5.2 5.3 3.1 3.1 3.5 3.4 2.6 2.8 10.4 10.7 
2007 4.7 4.8 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.5 1.9 2.5 9.5 9.8 
 
 
The main risks to the forecast concern oil prices, the huge global current 
account imbalances and rising inflationary pressures in Europe due to 
tightening labour markets. The latter two risks are analysed in detail below, 
while oil price risks were analysed in previous reports. Rich Japan, rich OPEC 
countries and poor China currently finance the deep US current account 
deficit. Rebalancing of current account positions is likely to weaken Euro Area 
growth. Stronger wage growth in the Euro Area may in the short term boost 
consumption and output, but in the longer term it will be detrimental to 
economic growth. 
    
1.2 
Global Outlook 1.2.1 KEY DEVELOPMENTS 
Below we discuss the key developments in commodity and financial markets 
underlying our current forecast. 
OIL PRICES 
Oil prices have remained volatile. After a record high of USD 78 per barrel 
(Brent) in early August last year, oil prices fell to close to USD 50 in January as 
an exceptionally mild winter in the Northern Hemisphere decreased demand, 
OPEC countries did not comply with agreed cuts in production and political 
tensions in the Middle East eased. The decline was strengthened by a change in 
behaviour of funds which started to bet on a fall in prices. However, as the 
weather in the US became unusually cold in February, as geopolitical tensions 
increased and as OPEC members improved their compliance with production 
targets, prices rose again to above USD 60 per barrel. 
 
The group expects the oil market to remain tight as demand, especially of 
emerging economies, continue to be rather strong, oil investments continue to 
be relatively moderate and as OPEC will lower production if prices drop 
substantially. Oil prices are expected to stay around USD 60 per barrel (average 
of Brent and Dubai oil), substantially below the autumn projection of USD 68 
per barrel. Naturally, oil prices would be substantially lower if global growth 
would falter. However, there is also a substantial upward risk to prices. Prices 
would rise if political tensions intensify and/or if global growth is stronger 
than projected. 
INTEREST RATES 
Monetary policy of key central banks has diverged since the middle of last year. 
The Federal Reserve has kept its federal funds rate at a somewhat restrictive 
level of 5.25%. The ECB has continued to make policy less accommodative in 
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pursuit of an inflation rate ‘close but under 2%’ in the medium term. In March, 
it raised its refinancing rate to 3.75%, almost double the 2% up to December 
2005. The Bank of Japan ended its zero rate policy in July last year; it took till 
February to hike its policy rate further, to 0.5%. In the projection period, the 
divergence in monetary policy continues. Weaker growth and a drop in core 
inflation will lead to cuts in the US federal funds rate from the second half of 
this year onwards. The ECB will increase its rate further to 4% (see also 
Chapter 2). The Bank of Japan will gradually normalise its policy rate. 
 
Long-term interest rates have not risen since mid-2006 and thus remain low in 
a historical perspective. Rather weak US data led to monthly drops up to 
November. More favourable data, reducing the risk of a substantial US 
slowdown, led to some rise in the following months, but this was mostly offset 
by global financial market turbulence at the end of February and in early 
March. Long-term rates are projected to be broadly flat in 2007 and to rise 
slightly in the Euro Area in 2008.  
EXCHANGE RATES 
At the end of last year and early this year, the euro has appreciated further vis-
à-vis the dollar and even more vis-à-vis the Japanese yen. Against the dollar, 
the euro came close to its record high of 1.35 reached in early 2005. Cyclical 
divergence between the US and the Euro Area, differences in expected policy 
changes and the huge US current account deficit probably all played a role in 
the recent euro appreciation. Our projections are based on some further 
nominal effective appreciation of the euro, with a rate of 1.38 dollar per euro 
in 2008. 
EQUITY PRICES 
Between the turmoil in May-June 2006 and renewed turbulence in February, 
global equity prices rose with unusually low volatility, reflecting favourable 
global economic developments and abundant global liquidity. The most recent 
turbulence had no clear cause. It started in Shanghai, where equity prices fell 
by 8% on rumours of macro-economic policy tightening. Comments on a 
possible recession in the US by the former Fed chairman made markets more 
nervous. Severe problems in the US subprime mortgage industry heightened 
the turmoil. Nevertheless, in mid-March the corrections on most equity 
markets were limited, with most equity indices only slightly lower than at the 
end of last year. Our projections are based on a limited rise in equity prices 
during the projection period. 
1.2.2 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
North America 
Output growth in North America accelerated slightly in 2006 relative to 2005 
(3.4 and 3.2 per cent respectively), driven by growth in the US economy. 
Inflation moderated due to lower oil prices and a reduction in the rate of VAT 
in Canada. Looking forward, the expected deceleration of the US economy will 
negatively affect the whole region through lower US demand for Canadian and 
Mexican goods. This US slowdown will occur because of weaker domestic 
demand. Growth in the US is forecast to be 2.4 and 2.3 per cent 2007 and 
2008 respectively, down from 3.3 per cent in 2006. 
 
Residential investment in the US contributed much to the deceleration of 
GDP growth in the course of 2006.  The correction in the housing sector 
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proved to be deeper than we had expected six months ago, as the share of 
residential investment in GDP (in volume terms) almost reached the average 
level of the 80s and the 90s in the fourth quarter of 2006. This outturn is 
broadly consistent with the alternative scenario we discussed in our last report 
(p. 23, Adjustment through the housing market). The simulations presented 
then suggested that GDP growth in the US would be 0.4 percentage points 
slower in the first year and 0.2 percentage points slower in the second year 
compared to our central forecast as a result of a more pronounced downturn 
in residential investment.  
 
The ongoing moderation in house price increases has only marginally affected 
private consumption. Consumption has been sustained by the positive effects 
on disposable income from the decline in oil prices, the sustained strength of 
the labour market and some acceleration in wage and salary growth. Lower 
absorption of imported goods and services combined with a sound external 
environment led to an improvement in real net trade so that its contribution to 
GDP growth in 2006 was zero after several years of negative contributions to 
growth. 
 
The adjustment in the housing sector and its spill-over effects to the rest of the 
economy, in particular on private consumption, remain the main risks in our 
forecast. According to the February Residential Construction Report, the sharp 
fall in housing permits seems to have slowed based on a three month moving 
averages. However, housing starts continue to decrease. Even if the worst of 
the housing sector correction is over, a large overhang of unoccupied housing 
suggests further possible reductions in residential investments in the first part 
of 2007, to be followed by a stabilization in the housing share of GDP at a 
level in line with the medium term average.  
 
Figure 1.2.1. Housing Investment/GDP (volumes) 
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As figure 1.2.1 illustrates, during previous housing market recessions in the 
early 1980s and early 1990s there was a temporary overcorrection in the 
housing market to GDP ratio, with the ratio dropping to about 3½ per cent of 
GDP. An overcorrection of this magnitude, illustrated by the dotted line, 
would slow US GDP growth to 1.8 per cent in 2007 and 2.1 per cent in 2008. 
In turn, this would reduce growth by 0.1 percentage points in the Euro Area in 
2007 and 2008. An overcorrection of the housing market of this magnitude 
would not necessarily lead to a recession in the US, but it is possible that the 
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quarterly dynamics could be associated with 2 consecutive quarters of output 
decline and hence a technical recession. 
 
At the national level in 2006, house prices did not decline but they did 
he weak housing market negatively affected employment in the construction 
flationary pressures seem to be reducing due to the negative contributions of 
inally, on the external imbalances, we do not expect major corrections. 
Asia 
 growth in Asia in the last quarter of 2006 was generally quite good 
 February, the Bank of Japan raised the policy rate by 25 basis points, brining 
continue to decelerate. However, this occurred without denting private 
consumption seriously. We forecast US house prices to further decelerate in 
2007 and 2008 and we investigate in section 1.4.1 the effects on US and Euro 
Area growth of a fall in US house prices. The financial burden of households, 
including debt service payments, insurances of houses, and car leasing 
continues to increase, and has reached almost 20 per cent of disposable 
income (11 per cent for mortgages alone). Decelerating house prices and 
increasing financial burdens will tend to impact on disposable income and 
hence on consumer spending. This is expected to reduce the annual growth 
rate by almost one per cent relative to the previous three years.  
 
T
sector, but at a national level it was offset by improvements in other sectors 
(especially services) so that employment rose by 1.9 per cent in 2006 and in the 
first two months of 2007. The expected deceleration of GDP growth in 2007 
and 2008 will imply a higher unemployment rate. 
 
In
the components directly linked to the energy prices. In contrast, services have 
not shown significant reductions. In the first two months of 2007 the “owner’s 
equivalent rent” component of consumer prices grew by 4.2 per cent, whereas 
services components like medical care services and education had annual 
growth rates above 6 per cent. The transport component of inflation decreased 
by 0.7 per cent as it benefited from the fall in oil prices after summer 2006. We 
expect inflation to fall from the level in 2006, due to lower commodity prices 
and to the deceleration of domestic demand. A less tight labour market, in 
addition, should help to reduce inflationary pressures from wages and salaries. 
As a reaction to the decreasing inflationary environment, we forecast the Fed 
to cut interest rates by 75 basis points starting from summer 2007. 
 
F
Slowing domestic demand growth will restrain imports and the weaker dollar 
should help exports. On balance we expect the current account deficit to 
improve by half percentage point of GDP over the forecast horizon (see 
section 1.4 below).   
Output
although decelerating. One notable exception was Japan whose GDP growth 
reached 1.3 per cent on the previous quarter, after a third quarter growth rate 
which was barely beyond zero. In Japan both domestic and external demand 
contributed to the acceleration but consumption remained subdued (1.0 per 
cent, annual rate) due to the moderate rise in household income. Business 
investment is the main driver of growth, boosted by high corporate profits, 
low interest rates and buoyant external demand.  
 
In
it to 0.5 percent.  The decision was not unanimous showing both a willingness 
to reach a “normal” rate as quickly as possible while at the same time the 
uncertainty regarding the economic situation. This uncertainty is present in 
particular with respect to inflation which is still on the brink of negative 
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territory. The growth of CPI was zero percent in January and is on a 
downward trend, with decelerating impulses from import prices. Industrial 
production is slowing, sales are still declining and the leading indicator is 
pointing down. The interest rate differential with many industrialized countries 
is producing a diffuse yen carry trade, bringing the yen exchange rate to very 
low levels in the first months of 2007. This is a point of concern for the 
international environment because a sudden unwinding of this trade could 
trigger a very rapid appreciation of the yen and a depreciation of the US dollar 
with dangerous results for financial flows. As of now the yen valuation 
increases the competitiveness of Japanese exports thereby maintaining a 
positive outlook for them.  
 
The Chinese economy is still growing at a very fast pace with a 10.4 percent 
 the last National People’s Congress annual session at least three decisions 
he outlook for the Asian countries is still very positive although a 
otwithstanding the policy restrictions of the monetary authorities, the 
yoy growth rate in the fourth quarter of 2006, albeit on a slightly decelerating 
path. In this context, it is worth mentioning a possible overestimation of 
export flows that may contribute to an overvaluing of real growth. The 
effectiveness of the policy measures (on interest rates, reserve requirements 
and administrative restrictions) in slowing down the overheating growth has 
been quite low. Recently, a new set of restrictions on reserve requirements 
(now 10 per cent) and interest rates (raised by 27 basis points to reach 6.39 for 
one year benchmark lending rate) was put in place in order to tackle the 
increasing inflationary pressure. Inflation is still low for an economy growing at 
over 10 per cent, but is rising (2.7 per cent yoy in February) and reached a level 
such that the real rate on deposits was negative. Consumption is growing at a 
fast pace according to the retail sales which grew by 14.7 per cent in January 
and February yoy. In the same period, the increase in real investments, the 
main target of the restrictive policy measures, was 23.4 per cent, only a bit 
slower than that registered a year ago.  
 
In
were taken that could influence the macroeconomic situation in China and 
worldwide. A new landmark law on private property was approved, stating that 
from October 2007 “the property of the state, the collective, the individual and 
other obligees is protected by law and no units or individual may infringe upon 
it”. A second law set a unified income tax for domestic and foreign companies 
at 25 per cent, wiping out the advantage granted to foreign enterprises until 
now (15 per cent is the current rate). This could produce a lower appetite for 
foreign direct investment. A third measure was the creation of China’s State 
FX Investment Corporation (SFEIC)  a sovereign wealth fund with an initial 
endowment of 300 bn$ out of the international reserves of PBoC, aimed at 
profit maximizing management of the massive amount of reserves. This 
obviously creates a new important operator on the international financial 
markets which is likely to be more stock than bond-oriented.  
 
T
deceleration in the pace of growth is foreseeable. This is due mainly to a 
worsening in non-Asian demand although this will be partly offset by Chinese 
and Indian growth in a context of tighter intra-area links.  
 
N
Chinese economy will maintain a GDP growth rate of around 9 per cent. The 
Olympic games and the universal Expo will add further investment demand to 
an already buoyant environment. The monetary policy, even after the recent 
hikes, could be judged as being accommodative. Real rates of about 4 per cent 
are approximately 6 percentage points lower than real growth. In addition the 
high growth of money supply (17.9 per cent growth in M2 in the fourth 
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quarter of 2006, yoy), due to the huge external surplus and the consequent 
reserve accumulation, is contributing to the ample credit expansion. Any fall in 
international demand could dent the export performance but domestic 
demand should benefit from buoyant consumption due to the policies aimed 
at substituting consumption for investment. This shift is pursued by cutting 
personal taxes, increasing welfare transfers and minimum wages, and also by 
sustaining rural income and by the previously cited measures to curb 
investments.  
 
Growth in Japan will be slower than in the rest of Asia. The public deficit and 
Non Euro Area European Economies 
 recent years, the main factor supporting growth in Russia has been the 
ecently, the government proposed a new economic programme to stimulate 
oth the Danish and Swedish economies are growing faster than the Euro 
 Sweden, strong GDP growth last year coincided with rising and large 
debt require a fiscal discipline that will not only constrain public expenditure 
and investments but will also impact on the expectations of households 
regarding future income. Consumption will probably remain subdued, given 
that wage growth has been barely positive in real terms. Lower international 
demand that will only be partially offset by the low exchange rate in the 2007 
could lower investment growth in the short term. It is unlikely that there will 
be a further hike in the interest rate in 2007 because of low inflation. Low 
inflation is likely to persist over the forecast horizon, given a small yen 
appreciation and subdued import prices and wages.  
 
In
strong expansion of domestic demand, thanks to favourable export revenues 
that have benefited from the high prices of raw materials. Two-digit growth 
rates for private consumption and investment led to a yearly growth rate of 
more than 6 %. Due to the stabilisation of oil prices and growing import 
demand the current account surplus has been reduced. Oil production 
stagnated in 2006, one of the reasons being that oil exploration and investment 
in new fields had been neglected in the last decade. On the other hand, gas 
production expanded rather fast. 
 
R
the diversification of growth and more innovations.  Furthermore, it is 
expected that Russia, after the end of the bargaining process with the USA, will 
join the WTO midst of 2007, thus giving more impetus to trade. Nevertheless, 
during the forecast period, economic growth will slow down slightly. Inflation 
will be further reduced, but the unemployment rate will remain almost 
unchanged.   
 
B
Area. Pulled by strong domestic demand, these economies are already growing 
above their potential, although exports are also growing strongly in both 
countries. Robust growth has pushed unemployment rates low and tightened 
the labour markets. There are already some signs of labour shortages especially 
in construction, but inflation has, so far, remained low. 
 
In
current account surpluses, even though the Swedish krona strengthened vis-à-
vis both the euro and the US dollar during the year. General government is 
running a surplus as well. Robust growth in Swedish export markets supports 
export growth, while the Riksbank aims to cool the domestic economy by 
tightening monetary policy. Swedish GDP growth will slow down somewhat 
but it will continue strong in 2007-8. A good economic performance will 
continue also in Denmark, albeit with growth that is expected to slow as 
capacity utilisation is already high. Imports are rising and the Danish current 
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account surplus is smaller as a percent of GDP than in Sweden due to stronger 
growth in imports. The Danish surplus is supported by North Sea oil and gas 
production, which both lower import demand for energy commodities and add 
to export revenues. A favourable international environment especially in 
Germany will support Danish growth in 2007-8. 
 
Official estimates suggest that the UK’s real economy expanded by 2.7 per 
flation, as measured on a variety of indices, was at its highest since the early 
nemployment in the UK, as measured by the survey based International 
ata suggests that the general government deficit was below 3 per cent in 
2006. We expect general government deficit to remain below 3 per cent as the 
                                                
cent in 2006, slightly above our estimates of its trend rate of growth. This 
strong economic growth, up from 1.9 per cent in 2005, was primarily driven by 
domestic demand. We expect robust growth of around 2¾ per cent this year, 
again, led by domestic demand. The domestic side of the economy has become 
more balanced with gross fixed investment providing more of a prop to the 
economy than in recent years. However, our forecast is for the economy to be 
supported by stronger growth of household consumption, in response to a 
pick-up in real household incomes and the rapid growth of both equity and 
housing assets in 2006. The UK housing market has recovered since the 
slowdown in 2005, and will support growth over our forecast horizon. Net 
trade remains a drag on the economy, and we expect this to continue this year. 
Figures for last year are distorted by the impact of Missing Trader Intra-
Community (MTIC) fraud. Official estimates suggest that goods to the value 
of £28.7bn were involved in MTIC fraud, equivalent to 7.8 per cent of total 
UK exports in 2006, or 2.2 per cent of nominal GDP. This is up from a figure 
of £11.2bn, or 0.9 per cent of GDP, in 2005. Including MTIC fraud, annual 
growth of export and import volumes is estimated to have been 11.2 and 11.5 
per cent respectively, in 2006. Excluding the impact of MTIC fraud, we expect 
export and import volume growth of around 6 per cent this year.  
 
In
1990s at the turn of the year. Inflation, as measured by the Consumer Prices 
Index, reached the 3 per cent upper bound of the inflation target in December 
2006. Concerns remain that average earnings growth may accelerate in 
response to the recent rises in inflation. Our central projection does not show 
an acceleration in average earnings, although it remains an upside risk to our 
inflation forecast. Data for the start of 2007 show inflation rates moderating. 
Interest rate expectations have been on the rise over the past year. Overall we 
expect inflation to fall back through this year, with CPI hovering just above the 
Bank of England’s target rate of 2 per cent over the next couple of years. 
Although due to the profile of CPI inflation throughout last year, the average 
annual figure for 2007 is above 2006. 
 
U
Labor Office definition, is currently around 5½ per cent. We expect this to rise 
to around 5¾ per cent in 2008 as the demand for employment grows at a more 
modest pace than in the recent past. The UK has received a rapid boost to its 
labour supply from a number of sources. The main two being: net inward 
immigration and a rise in the participation of older workers. Net inward 
immigration to the UK has been high since 1998. Since 2004 a significant 
proportion of these have been from the A82. There has also been a rise in the 
labour market participation rate of older workers in the years before 
retirement, and indeed those that have passed state pension age. 
 
D
 
2 We refer to the A8 rather than the A10 since subjects of Cyprus and Malta have had long-
standing rights to work in the UK. 
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public finances continue to improve over the short term. It should be noted 
that from 2008-9 we have assumed that government expenditure as a share of 
the economy declines. Indeed, published after the completion of this forecast, 
Budget 2007 has set the envelope for government spending over the coming 
years. Government spending as a share of GDP is expected to fall from 39.1 in 
2007-8 to 38.5 per cent in 2010-11. The discretionary policy introduced was 
broadly revenue neutral, although this belies a significant amount of re-
distribution within the economy. 
 
In 2006, the rate of growth in the new member states accelerated significantly 
p to 6.2% from 4.6% in 2005). Domestic demand was the driving force in 
ecast period and 
 fiscal stabilization programmes will be pursued in several countries, we 
 in the 
U15 and Euro area, but slightly lower than in the preceding year. There was, 
 
(u
these economies, an exception being Hungary. Investment was of particular 
importance and were stimulated by EU funded projects and FDI. In some 
countries, like Poland, Romania and Baltic states, investment increased by 
more than 10%. Growth in employment and even more the increase in wages 
(a reflection of both high growth in productivity and emigration to EU-15) 
contributed to income growth and hence strong consumption growth. Here 
again Hungary was an exception, with consumption stagnating due to an 
effective consolidation policy. A high growth rate in the global economy, and 
in particular, a higher growth rate in the EU, helped to increase exports in all 
new member states. In some countries (the Baltic states, Poland, Bulgaria) 
robust domestic demand led to higher imports and net exports made a 
negative contribution to GDP growth. In nearly all countries, we could 
observe a worsening of the current account figures relative to GDP. The 
strongest economic growth rates were seen in Latvia (12%) and Estonia 
(11.4%). In Hungary, Malta and Cyprus, with 3 to 4 % rates, growth was 
relatively modest. The biggest NMS - Poland – grew at 5.7%. 
 
As the outlook for world growth will be weaker during the for
as
forecast growth in all NMS12 countries to slow down, to just above 5% on 
average. However, the rate will still be more than twice that of EU15. In 
several countries we expect a further worsening of the foreign trade balance, 
but for most countries we do not see a deterioration of the current account 
relative to GDP. We also expect a slow-down in investment (due to temporary 
obstacles in the utilization of funds from the new EU budget 2007-13). The 
Baltic countries again will be the fastest growing economies (7-9%), but the 
growth differential with other countries will shrink. Hungary’s much lower 
growth rate of just 3% will reflect an increase in VAT and energy prices, which 
may dampen consumption, and also an expected cut in the budget deficit. On 
the whole, for several years now, growth in the NMS was relatively high and 
unemployment went down in most of these countries. For the forecast period, 
a similar development is expected, especially in the northern NMS countries 
where the labour market situation will become better in 2007 and 2008. 
 
Inflation in NMS12 in 2006 was 3.2%, one percentage point higher than
E
however, a substantial heterogeneity among the NMS12 countries, where 
inflation ranged from the EU-lowest 1.3% (Poland) to the EU–highest 7.3% 
(Bulgaria) and 6.6% (Romania and Latvia). These divergent inflation 
developments reflect differences in the pace of economic growth and nominal 
exchange rate trends as well as various domestic supply-side shocks. In general, 
inflationary pressures in NMS in 2006 were fuelled by rising prices for services 
and foodstuffs (convergence towards EU15) and were dampened by prices of 
industrial goods that showed near-zero inflation.  
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Inflation is expected to rise slightly to 3.6% in 2007 and to 3.8% in 2008. This 
increase has to be seen in the context of strong domestic demand, robust 
ports and higher wage increases in many larger NMS, e.g. in Poland and 
he upturn in the Euro Area continued in the second half of 2006. The slower 
h i he third quarter that followed the strong rise in output in the first 
e temporary. In the fourth quarter real GDP 
 in the second half of 
006. The slowdown in domestic demand registered for the fourth quarter 
grew at an annualised rate of around 1.5 per cent 
roughout the year, up from annual growth of 0.8 per cent in 2005. The 
eased 
1.3 Euro Area 
ex
Slovakia as well as upward tax adjustments (Hungary). An additional factor 
pushing inflation rates above the EU15 levels will be related to the Harrod-
Balassa-Samuelson effect which is expected to remain in force in the forecast 
period giving a constant boost to prices of non-tradables. 
 
 
EURO AREA FORECAST 
Detail T
growt n t
half of the year proved to b
growth rebounded to a quarterly rate of 0.9 per cent. This brought GDP 
growth to 2.8 per cent in 2006 on a working day adjusted basis (2.6 per cent 
not adjusted), slightly above the forecast made by EUROFRAME-EFN in the 
Autumn 2006 report. In the fourth quarter output was 3.3 per cent higher than 
a year earlier, which is the best performance since 2001. 
 
The economic expansion is broadly based with both domestic demand and the 
external sector having contributed substantially to growth
2
cannot be taken at face value as it reflects a major reduction in inventories in 
Germany which is hard to explain and probably reflects problems in the 
measurement of exports which rose steeply in that quarter without a 
corresponding rise in export demand or a similar rise in imports that would 
have signalled large re-exports flows. Final domestic demand remained firmly 
on track. The upturn in fixed investment continued, although average quarterly 
growth slowed slightly to 0.8 per cent in the second half of 2006, from 1.5 per 
cent in the first half of the year. Private consumption picked up steam in the 
course of the year reflecting improved conditions in the labour market and 
some acceleration in the growth rate of real disposable incomes, partly due to 
lower energy prices. Annual inflation as measured by the HICP fell to only 1.6 
per cent in October, down from 2.5 per cent in Spring mainly reflecting the 
drop in oil prices. Since then the rate of inflation has increased slightly albeit 
remaining below 2 per cent. 
 
The ongoing upturn in the Euro Area economy was clearly visible in the 
bour market. Employment la
th
unemployment rate continued to decline and was down to 7.4 per cent in 
January 2007, from 8.3 per cent in January 2006 and 8.9 per cent at the peak 
reached in March 2004. Changes in the unemployment rates differed 
substantially across countries. Unemployment was reduced substantially in 
Germany, France, Italy and Finland, but the progress was less pronounced in a 
number of countries with already tight labour markets such as Ireland and the 
Netherlands. In Spain the unemployment rate did not decline significantly 
despite robust economic growth. The rate remained at around 8.5 per cent 
with exceptionally strong growth in labour supply due to strong immigration 
being a possible explanation. Strong immigration and increased participation 
was also a major factor limiting the decline in unemployment in Austria.  
 
Despite the substantial reduction in unemployment, wage increases remained 
moderate in 2006. One important element behind this is probably incr
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competition as a result of the ongoing process of globalisation of production 
 the European Commission is at a relatively high 
 the ECB. It is expected to raise its main interest rate by 25 
asis points on one more occasion (over the forecast horizon), bringing rates 
r and next.  The moderation of 
processes. There was, however, a slight acceleration in average earnings growth 
at the Euro Area level, from 2.1 per cent in 2005 to 2.6 per cent in 2006. Given 
that unemployment rates are rapidly diminishing in an increasing number of 
countries, wages could accelerate further this year and next. Stronger gains in 
wages are expected to be especially pronounced in Germany, where earnings 
growth was particularly modest in previous years. Significant upward pressure 
on wages is also forecast for the Netherlands, Ireland and to some extent also 
for Finland. By contrast, there is no major acceleration of wage growth 
expected for the other Euro Area economies, including France, Italy and Spain 
where the external sector is struggling to maintain competitiveness which 
should keep wage growth in check over the forecast horizon. On aggregate, 
average earnings are forecast to rise by 2.9 per cent this year and 3.7 per cent 
next year, which should still be consistent with maintaining price level stability 
in the definition of the ECB. 
     
The outlook for production in the near term is still benign, but indicators 
suggest that the economy might have already peaked. While the Economic 
Sentiment Index published by
level, especially in the industrial sector, it has not increased further since 
autumn. The EUROFRAME-EFN indicator also suggests that growth will 
moderate slightly in the coming quarters. Part of this deceleration in the 
indicator can be explained by the expectation of slower growth as a response 
to the VAT-increase in Germany, where sentiment indicators declined most 
visibly in those sectors that are especially sensitive to potential effects of 
advanced purchases. However, our assessment of growth at the turn of the 
year is somewhat less pessimistic than these indicators suggest, in light of 
the most recent data on industrial output in Germany. Other factors weighing 
on economic sentiment include a moderation of growth in the rest of the 
world, particularly in the US, and the continued tightening of monetary policy 
by the ECB. These factors should, however, not lead to a severe deterioration 
in the economic environment in the Euro Area since the global economy is 
still expected to grow at above trend rates (see Chapter 1 on the global 
environment) and monetary policy is projected not to become restrictive to a 
significant extent.  
 
The forecasts for 2007 and 2008 assume only limited further tightening of 
monetary policy by
b
to 4 per cent by the early summer At this level of short-term interest rates, 
monetary policy should be broadly neutral (see Chapter 2, Section 1 on 
monetary policy). Fiscal consolidation is projected to continue resulting in a 
further reduction in the aggregate Euro Area budget deficit from 1.8 per cent 
in 2006 to 1.2 per cent in 2007 and 1.0 per cent in 2008. Fiscal consolidation 
will be implemented mainly in countries running deficits, and the fiscal impulse 
will be only slightly restrictive at the Euro Area level in both years. All in all, 
the tightening of both monetary and fiscal policy is expected to continue in 
2007, with no major change in policy stances. 
 
Against this background we forecast a continuation of the economic expansion 
in the Euro Area with real GDP growth slowing down only gradually to 2.5 
per cent and 2.2 per cent, respectively, this yea
output growth is due mainly to a deceleration in export growth that reflects 
slower expansion of export markets and a deterioration of price 
competitiveness as a result of a higher external value of the euro. Domestic 
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demand is projected to continue expanding at an almost unchanged pace of 
around 2.5 per cent. Within domestic demand private consumption is likely to 
strengthen driven on the back of further improvement in the labour market 
and a stronger rise in real disposable incomes. Private investment which had 
been the main driver of domestic demand last year is forecast to increase by 
another 5 per cent this year supported by strong demand for increasing 
capacities and still favourable financing conditions. Next year, we expect 
somewhat slower investment growth as capital profitability should decline, but 
to some extent this is also due to the effects of changes in depreciation rules in 
Germany. Imports will decelerate slightly reflecting the import content of 
diminishing export growth. The Euro Area-wide current account is forecast to 
remain in a marginal deficit position over the forecast horizon as the reduction 
in real net exports is more or less balanced by gains in the terms of trade. 
Country by country differences with respect to the current account balances 
will remain high.  
 
A distinctive feature of last year’s upturn has been the change in the regional 
distribution of intra-Euro Area growth. In particular Germany, which had 
nsistently and substantially underperformed the Euro Area average since the co
inception of the common currency, has closed the gap in 2006 as regards the 
annual average growth rate and was even well above the rest of the Euro Area 
in terms of growth during the year (in terms of the fourth quarter on fourth 
quarter growth rate). German GDP growth in 2006 turned out to be higher 
than expected six months ago (2.9 per cent instead of 2.4). More importantly, 
in contrast to our expectation of last September, we now expect that the 
German recovery will be sustained in 2007 (see country detail) and the German 
economy will grow in line with the Euro Area average over the forecast 
horizon. Part of the improvement reflects an end to the long-lasting decline in 
the German construction sector that had been a feature of the German 
economy since 1995. In addition it can be attributed to the pronounced wage 
moderation that had been the result of rising unemployment and increased 
competition in the German labour market in recent years and which has raised 
the international competitiveness of German producers markedly especially 
relative to other Euro Area economies. Now, after several years of 
sluggishness, German domestic demand is picking up. Starting in 2005, 
corporate investment revived, and now private consumption is eventually on 
the mend on the back of a rapid improvement in the labour market.  
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able 1.3.1   Euro Area Forecasta
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
T
  
Consumption 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.3
Private investment -3.4 2.1 3.3  
penditure 
 
sumer prices 
n deflator 
e 
% 
6 6 69.8 70.8 6
 
2.9 5.3 4.8 3.8
Government ex
(b)
2.3 1.8 1.0 1.4 2.4 1.8 1.8
Stockbuilding -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.2
Total domestic demand 0.2 1.7 2.0 1.9 2.5 2.4 2.6
Export volumes 1.6 1.1 6.4 4.5 8.1 6.2 5.1
Import volumes 0.3 3.2 6.3 5.4 7.5 6.1 6.1
GDP 0.9 0.8 1.8 1.5 2.8 2.5 2.2
Average earnings
nised con
4.2 2.9 2.2 2.1 2.6 3.0 3.9
Harmo 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.8 2.0
Private consumptio 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.9
Real personal disposable incom 1.3 0.9 1.5 1.0 1.4 2.3 2.4
Standardised Unemployment, 8.2 8.7 8.8 8.6 7.8 7.2 6.8
Govt. balance as % of GDP -2.5 -3.1 -2.8 -2.4 -1.8 -1.2 -1.0
Govt. debt as % of GDP 8.1 9.3 69 67 4.8
Current account as % of GDP 0.8 0.4 0.7 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
a  GDP data shown in tabl
b change as a per cent of GDP
e are adjusted for working-day variation. 
. 
ed in 2006 the Italian 
ic underperformer within the Euro Area in recent 
nomy on the other hand has lost ground in the past couple of 
ars relative to the Euro Area average. After growing at around average 
 
While the relative growth in Germany greatly improv
economy – another chron
years – continued to grow substantially slower than the Euro Area average in 
2006. In addition some of the momentum that was observed in the end of last 
year is judged to be temporary as the strong GDP growth is probably partly 
due to inadequate seasonal adjustment. However, the growth rate of 1.9 
percent last year represents a sharp improvement from almost stagnation in 
2005. This mainly reflects an improvement in industry that seems to have 
moved beyond a low-point after a prolonged period of adjustment to a loss in 
price competitiveness and increased competition form low-cost countries. We 
expect Italian industry to continue to contribute to economic growth both this 
year and next.  
 
The French eco
ye
growth rates, or slightly above, in the first years since the inception of the Euro 
Area, real GDP increased slightly less than the Euro Area total in 2005. In 
2006, the growth gap widened further to a negative 0.7/0.8 percentage points. 
The main reason behind the poorer French GDP performance was the 
negative contribution of net exports to GDP growth. A major reason behind 
this is the continued loss in market shares of French exporters in recent years 
(see Graph 1.3.1). While we do not expect market shares to turn around over 
the forecast horizon, we do project some moderation in the downward trend 
in the time to come. 
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Figure 1.3.1: Trade Shares of the major Euro Area Countries 
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With respect to the other Euro Area member countries, we expect relativel
ttle changes in relative growth performances over the forecast horizon. 
y 
li
Ireland, Greece, Spain, Finland and Austria all continue to grow faster than the 
Euro Area average, and the Netherlands should also register an increase in real 
GDP which is substantially higher than the average in 2008. Output in 
Belgium will continue to rise at around Euro Area average levels while 
Portugal is expected to reduce the negative growth gap substantially. Italian 
GDP growth will remain significantly below Euro Area GDP growth. On the 
whole, growth differentials are projected to be smaller than in previous years, 
with the unweighted standard deviation of country growth rates declining to 
0.74 in 2008, from the level of around 1.5 registered in the 2003-2006. 
 
The forecast is based on the following assumptions 
Oil prices will average US$57.8 per barrel in 2007 and US$59.5 per barrel in 
2008. 
The dollar/euro exchange rate will be 1.35 at the end of 2007 and 1.40 at the 
end of 2008. 
Short-term interest rate will be 4.1 percent at the end of 2007 and also at the 
end of 2008. 
Forecasts are based on data available up to mid-March 2007. 
The assumptions for commodity prices, exchange rates and interest rates used 
in the forecast were constructed by consensus, as the average projections of 
the 10 member Institutes. These are broadly consistent with current financial 
market expectations and forward markets, as the majority of Institutes use this 
information in constructing their own forecasts. 
GERMANY  
2006 was a year
in working day
 of strong recovery in Germany. Real GDP rose by 2.9 per cent 
s adjusted terms (2.7 per cent unadjusted - which is the figure 
usually referred to in Germany). In the second half of the year, real GDP 
continued to rise by almost 1 per cent per quarter, following the significant 
acceleration of growth in the first two quarters and after modest quarterly 
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growth in 2005. During the year, the expansion was driven by exports and a 
substantial acceleration in fixed investment. The turnaround in construction 
activity was also crucial. Private consumption showed some improvement but 
remained relatively sluggish. According to current official estimates, growth in 
the final quarter of 2006 was entirely due to net exports as domestic demand 
fell because of a massive reduction in inventories. There is, however, some 
scepticism as to whether the jump in exports in the statistics really reflects an 
increase in export activity, and the statistical office has reduced inventories 
massively in response. Imports rose moderately in line with final domestic 
demand.  The recovery of the labour market continued forcefully, helped by 
favourable weather conditions. The seasonally adjusted number of unemployed 
fell below 4 million in the first two months of this year for the first time since 
May 2002, and the unemployment rate dropped by more than one percentage 
point to 7.7 per cent from the year before (standardised unemployment rate). 
Employment growth has been significant, with the number of regular jobs 
having risen by almost 2 per cent since the trough in early 2006.3
 
Our current forecast for GDP growth in 2007 is 2.5 percent, only slightly 
elow the growth rate of last year. This is a substantial upward revision from 
irst months of 
007 lies in the record levels of backlogs of orders – surpassing even the levels 
                                                
b
our forecast made in September. In September, we had expected a significant 
slowdown of the German economy, partly as a result of the fiscal package that 
includes an increase of the regular VAT rate by 3 percentage points which 
became effective from the start of this year (see the EUROFRAME-EFN 
Autumn 2006 report for details). Contrary to our expectation of a reduction in 
output in the first months of 2007, in response to advanced purchases at the 
end of 2006, production seems to have continued expanding. In January 2007, 
industrial production including construction increased substantially and was 
significantly above its level in the fourth quarter of 2006. This raises the 
question whether the effects of the VAT increase on the quarterly pattern of 
demand has been grossly overestimated. A look at demand indicators, 
however, reveals that purchases of some important durables were advanced to 
2006 as expected. Car registrations, for example, saw a steep rise at the end of 
last year followed by a major fall in the first months of this year. Similarly, 
retail sales surged in December and were weak in January. Since the turn of the 
year the business climate has weakened significantly in the sectors that were 
expected to be especially affected by the VAT hike such as retail trade and 
residential construction. The impact on consumer prices seems to be largely in 
line with expectations. According to our estimates, inflation has been pushed 
up by about three quarters of a percentage point. This estimate is also 
consistent with the development of core inflation (excluding energy and food), 
which rose by 1.1 percentage points between June 2006 and January 2007. The 
fact that the inflation rate only increased slightly in January is partly due to the 
coincidence of falling energy prices and to the fact that apparently some of the 
increase in prices had taken place already in previous months.   
 
One of the reasons that output has remained strong in the f
2
seen during the peak of the reunification boom – despite the fact that order 
inflows have been stagnant around the turn of the year. In addition, exports 
have been especially vibrant, corporate investment has helped to maintain 
production and construction activity has benefited from unusually mild winter 
 
3 The substantial rise in employment is difficult to reconcile with the estimate of only modest 
growth of disposable income in the fourth quarter given in the Quarterly National Accounts. 
Similarly, a strong increase in VAT revenues is somehow at odds with the estimated moderate 
expansion of private consumption. Therefore, there seems to be scope for substantial upward 
revisions in the QNA (as we have seen in previous quarters).    
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weather.  Overall, leading indicators point to robust GDP growth in the first 
half of the year. In the second part of this year we expect the upswing to 
continue and become increasingly self-sustained. Investment should rise 
rapidly in view of high capacity utilization and the improved outlook for 
domestic demand, although part of the increase may be investment brought 
forward to escape a change in the tax code that will lead to stricter depreciation 
rules from 2008 onwards.  Private consumption is forecast to accelerate, 
reflecting stronger growth in real disposable income as a result of higher wage 
increases and increasing employment. Export growth, by contrast, will lose 
some momentum since the world economy is expected to grow at a more 
moderate pace.  In 2008, real GDP is expected to grow by 2.3 per cent, with 
private consumption being an increasingly important pillar of demand. Fiscal 
policy is expected to be broadly neutral after being restrictive in both 2006 and 
2007. Given robust economic growth, and under the assumption that better 
than projected revenue growth will not loosen the strings on the purse of the 
treasury too much, the deficit should shrink further to 0.3 per cent from 0.6 
percent which is expected to be achieved this year. While government 
expenditures will continue to rise at a slower rate than GDP, less pronounced 
than in previous years, and the income tax burden will rise due to tax 
progression, the reform of corporate taxation will cost around € 6.5 billion.  
(0.3 per cent of GDP). Unemployment is expected to decline further to 6.3 per 
cent in 2008, from 7.3 per cent in 2007 (2006: 8.4 per cent). Consumer price 
inflation will be 1.7 per cent in 2007 and increase to 1.9 per cent in 2008 due to 
higher wage growth and increased pricing power of firms.   
 
Box 1: Wage Growth in Germany 
Over the seven years to the end of 2006 real wage dynamics in Germany have 
been exceptionally weak, declining by 0.1 per cent per annum on average when 
we use the consumer deflator and rising by 0.3 per cent a year when we use the 
producer deflator. As a result the wage share in Germany has fallen by more 
than 3 per cent of GDP between 1999 and 2006. It appears that this period of 
slow growth in real wages and in the declining wage share has come to an end. 
We expect average hourly earnings to rise by 2.3 per cent this year and 3.8 per 
cent next year and in our forecast real wages, based on consumer prices, are 
forecast to grow at around 1.3 per cent a year, whilst our other measure will 
grow by 2.1 per cent a year. This will keep the labour share approximately 
constant over this period, with wages growing in line with fundamentals, and 
hence labour market developments can be seen as a return to normality. In the 
following simulation we investigate the effect that a sustained increase in 
German wage inflation has on the Euro Area economy. 
 
In NiGEM wages are set in a forward-looking environment, and there are 
several ways to change them. We do not think we are seeing any major change 
in behaviour at present, except in relation to the unusual patterns of the last 
few years. We can evaluate this judgement by asking what would be happening 
if wages were not being driven by fundamentals by rather by a wage shock. 
Our wage equations are estimated and come from Barrell and Dury (2003) and 
are based on Barrell and Anderton (1995). Expectations are instrumented in a 
forward and backward wage bargain. A change in bargaining structure can 
change the intercept of the equation and hence change the equilibrium level of 
employment. We can shift the equation residual to see what happens when 
bargaining changes. In addition expectations may drift and we can emulate that 
in backward mode.  
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The equation is estimated in error correction form (in italics), with a long run 
moderating influence from unemployment, geu. The dependent variable, 
gewage, is the nominal wage per person hour, which depends on the difference 
between the real product wage (gerpwage) and productivity, which is driven by 
technical progress. The ced is the price level and wgeinf is expected inflation, 
and the equation is dynamically and statically homogenous. 
 
log(gewage)-log(gewage(-1)) =  1.196632 - 0.00364*geu(-1) 
         0.16732*{log(gerpwage(-1) – log(productivity(-1))} 
   + (1.0-0.62441)* log(wgeinf) 
   + 0.62441* log(geced/geced(-1)) 
 
We can change the intercept either temporarily or permanently, but it is a 
parameter that depends on reservation wages so we need a reason to shock it. 
We raise the intercept in the long run structural part of the wage equation by 
1% permanently. Unemployment rises and inflation increases but the ECB 
raises rates and stays on target. We assume forward looking wages, financial 
markets and policy makers. Wages rise before unemployment and inflation rise 
and real disposable incomes rise initially, and hence consumption and output 
rise for a year or so. Interest rates and the exchange rate increase.     
   
Figure B1: The Effects of Wage Pressure in Germany                    
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A change in bargaining behaviour induces wage pressure, raises inflation 
noticeably and increases sustainable unemployment. A wage shock may also be 
an inflation expectations misperception, and we do have a simple learning 
equation for expectations that we can use, and we can shock it endogenously. 
We raised expected inflation by 1.0 for 12 quarters, which raises wages in the 
bargain. When we did this the misperception had little effect on inflation, but 
unemployment rose continually because the misperception is built into the 
bargain. The increase in unemployment is around 0.2 percentage points after 
three years, but there is no initial increase in output. We assume the shift in 
expectations is removed after three years and hence our long run solution 
remains unchanged. 
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Figure B2: Expectations effects in Germany 
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It is unlikely that emerging wage pressure are being driven by such a strong 
drift in inflation expectations, and there is also no good reason to assume that 
there has been a shift in bargaining power towards employees. Both of these 
would involve a rise in unemployment along with the rise in wage growth, and 
between 2005 and 2006 unemployment fell from 9.45 per cent to 8.37 percent 
in Germany, and we anticipate it will fall further to 7.3 percentage points in 
2008. The faster increase in wages embedded in our forecast is reflecting the 
improvement in the economic environment and should therefore not be seen 
as a wage shock to the economy, if we were to see unexpectedly strong wage 
pressure it is much more likely to come from emerging demand pressures that 
we have not yet observed, and hence it should be seen as a signal for strong 
growth not rising unemployment. 
FRANCE   
 grew by 2 per cent in 2006 following a mere 1.2 per cent in 2005. 
he quarterly path for output growth was highly volatile in 2006 and could 
in national accounts.   
French GDP
Domestic demand excluding stockbuilding grew by 2.7 per cent in 2006, 
substantially more rapidly than output. Household consumption remained the 
main engine for growth (rising by 2.7 per cent), while government 
consumption rose by almost 2 per cent and investment by 3.5 per cent. A 
reduction in inventories reduced growth by 0.3 percentage points. The 
contribution of net external trade to GDP growth remained negative for the 
fourth year in a row, although to a smaller extent, reducing output growth by 
0.3 percentage points in 2006, after an average annual 0.8 percentage points 
from 2003 to 2005.  
 
T
hardly be reconciled with information delivered by survey data in the second 
and third quarters of the year (GDP grew by 1.1 per cent in the second quarter 
and by 0.0 in the third quarter). However with 0.6 per cent growth in the 
fourth quarter, GDP growth was back in line with survey data. On the basis of 
data available up to end February, OFCE’s quarterly GDP growth indicator 
predicts a 0.7% growth for each of the first two quarters of the year which is 
slightly above our EUROFRAME-EFN forecast. This is similar with last year’s 
developments, when OFCE’s indicator predicted slightly more optimistic than 
observed growth in 2006, which may perhaps suggest future upwards revisions 
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Industrial production remains weak, with growth 0.6 per cent lower in the last 
ree months ending in January 2007 than a year earlier. Production in the 
er 
nt in 2008, remaining slightly below the Euro Area average (resp. 2.5 and 2.2 
nnual 1.2 per 
nt only in February 2007 (as compared to 1.8% in the Euro Area) and there 
htly expansionary in 2007, contrary to the objectives 
nounced in the latest update of the Stability Programme (where a 0.4 
DP grew by 1.9 per cent in 2006 (1.6 per cent in the Autumn Report) 
e to strong and unexpected growth in the fourth quarter (1.1 per cent 
th
automobile industry continues to be one of the major components dragging 
down industrial output (-6.9 % at the turn of the year as compared to a year 
earlier), although having declined less rapidly in the second half of the year.  
 
We expect French GDP to grow by around 2.2 per cent in 2007 and by 2 p
ce
per cent). In terms of demand components, the main weakness of the French 
economy is on the export side. French exporters have been losing substantial 
market shares over the last few years, which cannot be fully explained by 
developments in price competitiveness and contrasts strongly with German 
gains in export market shares over the same period. Among possible 
explanations for the losses in French export market shares, would be the 
specialisation of French exporters who are less specialised in investment 
goods, as opposed to German exporters who benefit more from strong 
demand in investment goods in times of acceleration of growth and also from 
buoyant demand from emerging countries. However, the unexplained losses in 
French export market shares of the last few years may have come to an end in 
2006, when French export growth was more in line with export demand and 
export price competitiveness. Our forecasts for exchange rates will not allow 
French exports to gain market share in the forecasting horizon and the 
deceleration of export demand will dampen export growth. Net external 
trade’s contribution to GDP growth will be close to 0 per cent.  
 
Inflation has remained subdued, with the HCPI rising by an a
ce
are hardly any signs of rising inflationary pressures in the coming months. We 
expect HCPI inflation to accelerate slightly from 1.3 per cent in 2007 to 1.6 in 
2008. Under our GDP growth assumptions and the progressive declining 
effect of past employment policy measure, the unemployment rate (in terms of 
the Eurostat standardised measure) could settle at around 8.5 this year and 
next, from 9% in 2006. 
 
Fiscal policy may be slig
an
percentage point of GDP improvement in the structural deficit was 
announced). We project government spending to rise more rapidly than 
announced in the last update of the SP up to 2008 (by close to 2% in real 
terms rather than 0.6 per cent in the SP’s update). At the end of March 2007, 
forecasts for fiscal plans are however highly uncertain because of the 
presidential elections to held in late April followed by parliamentary elections 
in June. Our forecasts include the income tax cuts announced in the last 
budget, but other measures may be implemented later this year. Fiscal policy 
will probably not be as contractionary as announced in the latest SP’s update 
where a substantial negative fiscal impulse was announced (0.7 percentage 
point of GDP). We only expect a slight fiscal tightening in 2008, which would 
leave the government deficit close to 2.8 per cent of GDP in both years. 
ITALY 
Italian G
largely du
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q-o-q, partly due to exceptional factors4). This constitutes a significant 
improvement from the 0.1 per cent growth rate recorded in 2005. The main 
driving force was the recovery in industrial production which grew by 2.3 per 
cent and so ended a five year long recession. The recovery was spread across 
most components but especially concentrated among export-oriented 
industries. In fact, Italian exporters took good advantage of the German 
recovery, and of investment demand especially. In addition, signs of a shift in 
exports towards higher quality products and the effect of a deep restructuring 
of manufacturing production through off-shoring and re-branding of products 
may have improved the competitive position of firms.  
 
The industrial production index decreased by 1.4 per cent (m-o-m) in January, 
after a downwardly-revised increase of 1.4 per cent (m-o-m) in December. 
This confirms our forecast of a deceleration in the first quarter of 2007, due to 
a pay-back from the stronger-than-expected increase in the fourth quarter, in 
addition to the likely unwinding of German orders (due to the VAT hike) and 
the increase in Italian personal tax rates. Taking account of the reduction in the 
pace of recovery in the first half of the year, our GDP forecast for 2007 has 
been revised to 1.8 per cent (y-o-y), given that 1.2 per cent is carried over 
growth.  
 
Unemployment has continued to decline and the rate currently stands at 6.8 
per cent, while employment grew by 1.6 per cent after declining for six 
quarters. This is likely to reflect the regularisations of immigrants, but also a 
strong increase in employment in industry, after seven years of decline. 
Notwithstanding the employment increase, productivity growth accelerated last 
year. The apparent increase in the labour intensiveness of production appears 
to be a structural phenomenon and, with labour force participation rates 
among women and older workers quite low for European averages, this 
process could continue for some time.  
 
We expect Italian CPI inflation to moderate from 2.1 per cent in 2006 to 1.8 
per cent this year, the same as our forecast for overall Euro Area HICP 
inflation. Other than common factors driving the Euro Area inflation 
dynamics – favourable energy base effects and the impact of euro appreciation 
– the moderation of annual CPI inflation will also reflect Italy’s specific 
factors. First, the effects of the Bersani Decree should help to contain inflation 
by lowering prices of some medicines and certain type of services; second, the 
reduction of the payroll tax wedge should be translated to lower prices. 
 
The deficit-to-GDP ratio increased from 4.1 per cent in 2005 to 4.4 per cent in 
2006. Net of extraordinary burdens5 the deficit-to-GDP ratio decreased to 2.4 
per cent. 
 
The sharp improvement in Italy’s government balance in 2006 came from the 
huge increase in tax revenues. Several factors played a role: the favourable 
                                                 
4 While the figures are calendar day adjusted, this does not take into account the position of 
December holidays within the weeks, which exceptionally reduces the number of “free” holidays 
in December. 
5 Extraordinary burdens are due, first, to the VAT sentence issued by the European Court of 
Justice on deducibility for motor vehicles, that imply Italian taxpayers will be refunded for 
unduly paid VAT for an amount of 1.2 p.p. of GDP; second, the effects of the decision of 
including in public deficit 0.9 p.p. of GDP of liabilities linked to the financing of Hight-
speed/hight capacity rail network system. This debt is formally in the books of the rail 
infrastructure management company RFI/TAV, an entity external to the Public Administration, 
but the “true debtor” is in charge of the Government, as Eurostat set in May 2005. 
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economic situation has enlarged tax basis especially affecting corporate taxes 
and VAT; the measures introduced by the Budget law for 2006 were more 
effective than expected and finally, some consolidation measures (introduced 
in July by the so called “Decreto Bersani”) exerted a positive influence on 
fiscal balances. Due to these factors, revenue grew by 10 per cent with respect 
to 2005 (37.7 billion euro): according to the government, 8.1 billion euro are 
due to one-off factors, 5 billion from the Budget Law, 10 billion from the 
economic recovery. The difference, around 37 per cent of total increase, is 
linked to the anti tax evasion measures and to an improvement of tax 
compliance. As a result, the tax burden increased by 1.7 percentage points of 
GDP, from 40.6 to 42.3 per cent. 
 
On March 16th the update of the government forecast was released6: the 
deficit to GDP ratio has been revised downwards to 2.3 per cent for both 2007 
and 2008, due to an upward revision of GDP growth7 and to the better than 
expected results for 2006, that carry over into 2007. 
 
Because the nature of the extraordinary revenue increases in 2006 is not 
completely clear, we consider them as being brought forward in anticipation of 
the measures included in the Budget Law for 2007 aimed at increasing tax 
compliance and reducing tax evasion. Keeping the cyclically adjusted budget 
balance unchanged, we expect the deficit to-GDP ratio to be coherent with the 
SP target of 2.8 per cent this year, due to the adoption of a restrictive fiscal 
package, that set permanent measures in place of temporary ones, and the 
favourable macroeconomic scenario. This will result in a less restrictive fiscal 
impulse this year, as part of the measures introduced by the Budget law in 
order to reduce tax evasion and increase tax compliance had already come into 
effect in 2006.  
 
Looking ahead, cuts in the social contributions leading to a reduction in labour 
costs should facilitate export performance and business investment. Adding to 
that a steady decline in the unemployment rate, coupled with a stabilisation of 
inflation at around 2.0 per cent, supporting consumption growth, GDP growth 
is forecast to rise to around 1.5 per cent in 2008. 
 
 
1.4 Additional 
topics 
1.4.1 GLOBAL IMBALANCES AND US ADJUSTMENT 
The US current account is large and may not be sustainable, and correction 
could start domestically through a change in absorption or internationally 
through a market driven correction of the real exchange rate. The US has been 
issuing a lot of debt, as have US households. Risk premia could rise in the 
housing market causing prices to fall and demand to contract. Alternatively risk 
premia on US assets potentially held abroad could rise, with a wedge arising 
between US and other countries real interest rates. The source of the 
adjustment matters both in the short run and the long run. Adjustment within 
the US in the short run has smaller spillovers to the rest of the world than 
adjustment through the exchange rate.  
 
We implement a small change in the US risk premium in our model NiGEM. 
We assume financial markets, labour markets and the investment decisions are 
forward looking, with forward looking long term interest rates affecting 
                                                 
6 Relazione unificata sull’economia e la finanza pubblica (Unified quarterly report on the 
economy and cash borrowing requirement), Ministry of Economy and Finance. 
7 From 1.3 pp to 2 pp in 2007, from 1.5 pp to 1.7 pp in 2008. 
  
 
22 ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EURO AREA 
investment directly. We shift the premium through the residual on the forward 
looking arbitrage equation 
 
)1))(1/()1((1 ttttt rprhrfee +++= +     (1) 
 
where rht is the interest rate at home, rft is the interest rate in the partner 
country and rpt is a risk premium. We shift the risk premium by enough to 
improve the US current account by 1.0 per cent of GDP in the medium term, 
and this raises long term real interest rates in the US by about 0.6 percentage 
points, and cuts them elsewhere, inducing an immediate jump in the US real 
exchange rate of 4 per cent. US output growth would slow immediately as a 
result of the impacts of permanently higher real interest rates, as we can see 
from Figure 1.4.1, even though the US has devalued.  
 
Figure 1.4.1: Impacts on US GDP 
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There may have been an accumulation of risk in the US banking system 
because of poorly collateralised loans, and lenders may become more cautious. 
We may model this by putting a risk premium (rph) mark up above the risk 
free rate (rh) into the forward looking house price equation we have on the 
model as set out in equation (2) which can be rewritten as an infinite sum of 
future discounted rental flows  
 
pht=pht+1/((1+rht)(1+rpht))+rentalt    (2) 
 
House prices (ph) move in line with the expected discounted current value of 
future rental values, and a rise in the premium causes them to jump down, and 
then they continue to fall for several more years as we can see from Figure 
1.4.2.  
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Figure 1.4.2: US House Prices 
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We induce a risk premium that produces a large enough shift in demand to 
improve the US current account in the same way as our exchange rate risk 
premium. The fall, as compared to baseline, of 23 per cent in house prices over 
three years or so affects consumption, both through it dynamic effects and 
through its long run impact on wealth, as Barrell and Davis (2005) detail in 
their discussion of our US consumption function. Figure 1.4.1 plots the 
impacts on US GDP as compared to our exchange rate shock. If US house 
prices adjust consumption falls, savings rise and hence long term real interest 
rates fall by 0.5 percentage points and output rise marginally above base in the 
long run. If adjustment is through exchange risk premia US output is lower 
because real interest rates there are higher. 
 
Impacts on the Euro Area differ between these two scenarios because of the 
associated impacts on the real exchange rate, even though the impacts on the 
US are similar in the fist four years. If the adjustment is internal to the US, 
then demand impacts on the Euro Area come mainly through absorption, 
whilst a risk premium market based adjustment also has an impact through the 
noticeable appreciation of 3.6 per cent in the real effective euro exchange rate. 
We can see from Figure 1.4.3 that a one point of GDP improvement in the US 
current account will have 3 times the effect on Euro Area output in the second 
year of the experiment when driven by external factors than when driven by 
internal ones. If the current account were to improve by 3 per cent of GDP as 
a result of a risk premium shock then Euro Area growth could slow by up to 
half a point a year for two to three years. In the long run real interest rates 
would be lower by half a point in the exchange risk premium case and a third 
of a point in the housing market adjustment scenario, and hence output would 
be higher as the capital stock would increase If the US adjustment were 
internal the impacts on Europe would be much less. In both cases in the long 
run real interest rates are lower and hence output remains above our baseline. 
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Figure 1.4.3: Impacts on Euro Area GDP 
 
 
1.4.2 INTEREST RATE EFFECTS IN THE EURO AREA 
 
It is useful to understand the channels through which the interest rate works. 
Initial effects may come form exchange rate changes, whilst longer term effects 
may come from the effects of output on inflation. We undertake a set of 
experiments to decompose these channels. In Figure 1.4.4 we look at the effect 
of a 1.0 percentage point increase in the interest rate in the Euro Area 
sustained for two years, and then we set interest rates following a Taylor rule. 
A rise in interest rates cause the exchange rate to jump up, and therefore we 
take the exchange rate change that comes with this innovation and put it back 
on the model with fixed interest rates. This allows us to say how much of the 
change comes from the exchange rate effect alone. We assume forward 
looking financial markets and wage bargainers, but consumers are assumed to 
be myopic. 
 
Figure 1.4.4: Isolating the Exchange Rate Effect 
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In the first year in our model almost 90 per cent of the effects or -0.14 on 
inflation of the rise in interest rates come through the effects of the associated 
rise in the exchange rate, with the direct effects of interest rates being smaller 
and coming through later. In the second year inflation is 0.11 lower than the 
baseline, with 40 per cent of this coming from demand effects. Around one 
third of the demand effect comes from the interest rate. These effects may 
seem small as compared to those suggested by Central Banks. If we assume 
forward looking consumers in the Euro Area then the demand effects of a rise 
in the interest rates are more than twice as big, as we can see from Figure 1.4.5. 
The exchange rate effect of the innovation are the same, and hence the 
differences in the inflation effect come from the different assumptions about 
consumers. As a result inflation effects are noticeably larger, especially in the 
second year. However, they remain small.  
 
Figure 1.4.5: Forward and Backward Consumers 
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  Annex Table 1: Su ary of Key Forecast Indicators for Euro Areamm        a 
 
 
 
a GDP data shown 
in the tables are adjusted for working-day variation. 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Output Growth Rate 0.9 0.8 1.8 1.5 2.8 2.5 2.2 
Inflation Rate 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.8 2 
Unemployment Rate 8.2 8.7 8.8 8.6 7.8 7.2 6.8 
Gov. Balance as % GDP -2.5 -3.1 -2.8 -2.4 -1.8 -1.2 -1 
 
 
Annex Table 2: Real GDP in Major Economies 
 World OECD NAFTA China 
EU-
27 
Euro 
Area USA Japan Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
1996-
2002 3.6 2.7 3.3 8.6 2.5 2.4 3.3 0.8 1.6 2.3 1.7 2.9 
2003 4.1 2 2.4 10 1.3 0.8 2.5 1.5 -0.2 1.1 0.1 2.7 
2004 5.3 3.2 3.9 10.1 2.3 1.8 3.9 2.7 0.8 2 1 3.3 
2005 4.9 2.6 3.2 10.2 1.8 1.5 3.2 1.9 1.1 1.2 0.2 1.9 
2006 5.3 3.1 3.4 10.7 3 2.8 3.3 2.2 2.9 2 1.9 2.7 
2007 4.8 2.4 2.5 9.8 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.2 1.7 2.6 
2008 4.5 2.5 2.4 9.1 2.4 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.2 2 1.4 2.3 
 
 
 
 
Annex Table 3: Private Consumption Deflator in Major Economies 
 OECD NAFTA China EU-15
Euro 
Area USA Japan Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
1996-
2002 2.1 2.5 1.5 1.9 1.9 1.8 -0.4 1 1.1 2.7 2.2 
2003 1.8 2.2 1.2 2.1 2.2 2 -0.9 1.6 1.7 2.8 1.9 
2004 2.1 2.7 3.9 1.9 2 2.6 -0.7 1.6 1.6 2.6 1.7 
2005 2.1 2.9 1.9 2.1 2 2.9 -0.8 1.3 1.8 2.4 2.5 
2006 2.2 2.7 1.5 2.1 2.1 2.8 -0.3 1.3 1.2 2.7 2.3 
2007 2.2 2.6 2 2.1 2 2.3 0.4 1.5 1.6 2.4 2.9 
2008 2.3 2.6 1.8 2.1 1.9 2.5 1.2 1.9 1.6 2.2 2.7 
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Annex Table 4:  World Trade Volume and Prices 
 World trade volume 
World export prices 
in $ 
Oil price ($ 
per barrel)a
 Annual percentage changes 
1996-2002 6.5 -2.8 20.4 
2003 5.1 9 27.8 
2004 10.3 7.9 35.9 
2005 7.3 3.7 51.8 
2006 9 2.5 63.4 
2007 6.4 5 57.8 
2008 6.2 3.9 59.5 
a Based on the unweighted average of the Brent, WTI (West Texas Intermediate) and Dubai oil 
prices. 
 
 
Annex Table 5: Interest Rates 
 
 Short-term interest rates  Long-term interest rates  
 USA Japan 
Euro 
Area UK USA Japan Euro Area UK 
2003 1.2 0.0 2.3 3.7 4 1.1 4.1 4.5 
2004 1.6 0.0 2.1 4.6 4.3 1.5 4.1 4.9 
2005 3.5 0.0 2.2 4.7 4.3 1.3 3.4 4.4 
2006 5.2 0.2 3.1 4.8 4.8 1.8 3.9 4.5 
2007 5.1 0.7 4 5.7 4.7 1.8 4.0 4.9 
2008 4.5 1.0 4.1 5.6 4.8 2.0 4.2 4.9 
         
2006Q1 4.7 0.1 2.6 4.5 4.6 1.7 3.7 4.2 
2006Q2 5.2 0.1 2.9 4.6 5.1 1.9 4.1 4.6 
2006Q3 5.4 0.4 3.2 4.9 4.9 1.7 3.8 4.6 
2006Q4 5.3 0.4 3.6 5.2 4.6 1.7 3.9 4.6 
         
2007Q1 5.3 0.6 3.8 5.5 4.7 1.7 3.9 4.9 
2007Q2 5.2 0.6 4.0 5.7 4.7 1.8 4.0 4.9 
2007Q3 4.9 0.7 4.1 5.7 4.8 1.8 4.0 4.9 
2007Q4 4.8 0.8 4.1 5.7 4.7 1.9 4.1 4.9 
         
2008Q1 4.6 0.9 4.1 5.7 4.7 1.9 4.2 4.9 
2008Q2 4.5 1.0 4.1 5.6 4.8 2.0 4.2 4.9 
2008Q3 4.5 1.1 4.1 5.5 4.8 2.0 4.3 4.9 
2008Q4 4.5 1.2 4.1 5.4 4.8 2.1 4.3 4.9 
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Annex Table 6: Effective Exchange Rates 
 USA Japan Euro Area Germany France Italy UK 
 Annual percentage changes 
2003 -6.1 4.2 13.8 6.6 6.4 7.1 -2.7 
2004 -4.4 3.7 5.5 2.3 2.3 2.7 5.3 
2005 -2.7 -3.9 -1.0 -0.8 -0.3 -0.6 -1.5 
2006 -1.0 -5.7 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.8 
2007 -0.8 -4.0 4.0 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.6 
2008 -0.8 1.1 3.6 1.9 1.8 2 -2.6 
   
2006Q1 -1.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.7 
2006Q2 -1.5 1.5 3.1 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.5 
2006Q3 -0.3 -2.3 1.4 0.7 0.5 0.8 2.0 
2006Q4 -0.1 -0.7 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.2 1.4 
   
2007Q1 0.0 -2.5 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.8 
2007Q2 -0.2 -0.2 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.5 -0.5 
2007Q3 -0.2 -0.2 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.5 
2007Q4 -0.2 -0.2 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.5 
   
2008Q1 -0.2 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.5 -0.7 
2008Q2 -0.2 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.8 
2008Q3 -0.2 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.8 
2008Q4 -0.2 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.5 -0.8 
 
 
Annex Table 7: Euro Area, Main Features of Forecasta
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Annual percentage changes 
Volumes   
Consumption 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.3 
Private investment -3.4 2.1 3.3 2.9 5.3 4.8 3.8 
Government expenditure 2.3 1.8 1.0 1.4 2.4 1.8 1.8 
Stockbuildingb -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 
Total domestic demand 0.2 1.7 2 1.9 2.5 2.4 2.6 
Export volumes 1.6 1.1 6.4 4.5 8.1 6.2 5.1 
Import volumes 0.3 3.2 6.3 5.4 7.5 6.1 6.1 
GDP 0.9 0.8 1.8 1.5 2.8 2.5 2.2 
Average earnings 4.2 2.9 2.2 2.1 2.6 3.0 3.9 
Harmonised consumer prices 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.8 2.0 
Private consumption deflator 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.9 
Real personal disposable 
income 1.3 0.9 1.5 1.0 1.4 2.3 2.4 
 Levels 
Standardised unemployment %  8.2 8.7 8.8 8.6 7.8 7.2 6.8 
Government financial balancec -2.5 -3.1 -2.8 -2.4 -1.8 -1.2 -1.0 
Government debtc 68.1 69.3 69.8 70.8 69 67 64.8 
Current accountc 0.8 0.4 0.7 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 
a See footnote a of Annex table 1. 
b Change as percentage of GDP.  c As a percentage of GDP.  
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Annex Table 8: Real GDP in the European Union a
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Annual percentage changes 
Austria 0.8 2.3 2.6 3.3 3.0 2.6 
Belgium 1.0 2.7 1.5 3.0 2.3 2.1 
Denmark 0.4 2.1 3.1 3.2 2.6 2.6 
Finland 1.9 3.5 3.0 5.5 2.6 2.6 
France 1.1 2.0 1.2 2.0 2.2 2.0 
Germany -0.2 0.8 1.1 2.9 2.5 2.2 
Greece 4.9 4.7 3.7 4.3 3.4 3.5 
Ireland 4.3 4.3 5.5 6.2 5.1 4.0 
Italy 0.1 1.0 0.2 1.9 1.7 1.4 
Netherlands 0.3 2.0 1.5 2.9 2.6 2.7 
Portugal -1.1 1.2 0.4 1.3 1.9 2.0 
Spain 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 
Sweden 1.8 3.6 2.9 4.7 3.3 3.0 
United Kingdom 2.7 3.3 1.9 2.7 2.6 2.3 
Poland 4.0 5.2 3.4 5.7 5.5 5.0 
Hungary 4.1 4.9 3.6 4.5 3.0 3.0 
Czech Rep 3.6 4.2 6.1 6.2 5.1 5.6 
Estonia 7.1 8.1 10.5 11.4 8.6 7.6 
Latvia 7.2 8.2 11.2 12.0 8.4 7.1 
Lithuania 10.3 7.3 7.6 7.4 6.8 6.1 
Slovakia 4.2 5.4 6.0 8.3 8.0 5.9 
Slovenia 2.5 4.0 4.3 5.5 4.3 3.9 
Romania 4.7 5.2 3.7 7.8 6.2 5.4 
Bulgaria 4.5 5.6 5.5 6.4 5.9 5.3 
  
Euro Area 0.8 1.8 1.5 2.8 2.5 2.2 
EU-15 1.1 2.1 1.6 2.8 2.6 2.3 
NMS-12 4.2 5.1 4.6 6.2 5.4 5.0 
EU-27 1.3 2.3 1.8 3.0 2.7 2.4 
a GDP data shown in the tables are adjusted for working-day variation. 
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Annex Table 9: Harmonised Inflation in the European Union 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 Annual percentage changes 
Austria 1.3 1.9 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Belgium 1.5 1.9 2.5 2.3 1.6 1.7 
Denmark 2.0 0.9 1.7 1.8 1.8 2.0 
Finland 1.3 0.1 0.8 1.3 1.3 1.3 
France 2.2 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.3 1.6 
Germany 1.0 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.9 
Greece 3.4 3.0 3.5 3.3 2.7 2.6 
Ireland 4.0 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.9 2.3 
Italy 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.2 
Netherlands 2.2 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.3 
Portugal 3.3 2.5 2.1 3.0 2.5 1.8 
Spain 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.6 2.5 2.5 
Sweden 2.3 1.0 0.8 1.5 1.6 1.8 
UK 1.4 1.3 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.2 
Poland 0.7 3.6 2.2 1.3 2.2 2.6 
Hungary 4.7 6.8 3.5 4.0 6.6 4.3 
Czech Rep -0.1 2.6 1.6 2.1 2.3 2.8 
Estonia 1.4 3.0 4.1 4.3 4.0 3.0 
Latvia 2.9 6.2 6.9 6.6 6.8 5.1 
Lithuania -1.1 1.2 2.7 3.8 4.2 2.7 
Slovakia 8.5 7.4 2.8 4.3 2.5 2.9 
Slovenia 5.7 3.7 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 
Romania 15.3 11.9 9.1 6.6 5.4 7.2 
Bulgaria 2.3 6.2 5.0 7.3 6.2 6.8 
Euro Area 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.8 2.0 
EU-15 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 1.8 2.0 
NMS-12 3.1 5.0 3.4 3.2 3.6 3.8 
EU-27 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.1 
 
 
Annex Table 10: Fiscal Balances in the EU-15 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 % GDP 
Austria -1.6 -1.2 -1.5 -1.1 -1.0 -1.0 
Belgium 0.0 0.0 -2.3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 
Denmark 0.0 1.7 4.0 3.2 2.6 2.2 
Finland 2.5 2.3 2.7 3.9 3.5 3.3 
France -4.2 -3.7 -2.9 -2.8 -2.8 -2.7 
Germany -4.0 -3.7 -3.2 -1.7 -0.5 -0.3 
Greece -4.9 -6.2 -4.2 -3.7 -3.1 -2.6 
Ireland 0.2 1.5 1.0 2.2 1.8 1.5 
Italy -3.5 -3.4 -4.1 -4.4 -2.6 -2.2 
Netherlands -3.1 -1.8 -0.3 0.2 -0.1 0.7 
Portugal -2.9 -3.2 -6.0 -4.5 -3.8 -2.9 
Spain 0.0 -0.2 1.1 1.4 0.8 0.6 
Sweden 0.1 1.8 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.0 
United Kingdom -3.2 -3.2 -3.0 -2.9 -2.9 -2.8 
 
Euro Area -3.1 -2.8 -2.4 -1.8 -1.2 -1.0 
Eu-15 -2.9 -2.6 -2.2 -1.7 -1.3 -1.1 
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Annex Table 11: Standardised Unemployment Rate in the European Union 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 % Total labour force 
Austria 4.3 4.8 5.2 4.8 4.5 4.4 
Belgium 8.2 8.4 8.4 8.2 7.8 7.8 
Denmark 5.4 5.5 4.8 3.9 3.4 3.6 
Finland 9.0 8.9 8.4 7.8 7.2 7.2 
France 9.4 9.6 9.7 9.0 8.4 8.5 
Germany 9.1 9.5 9.5 8.4 7.4 6.4 
Greece 9.7 10.5 9.8 8.9 8.5 8.1 
Ireland 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.8 
Italy 8.4 8.0 7.7 6.8 6.2 6.1 
Netherlands 3.7 4.5 4.7 3.9 3.3 3.0 
Portugal 6.2 6.6 7.6 7.4 7.2 7.1 
Spain 11.1 10.6 9.2 8.6 8.4 8.0 
Sweden 5.6 6.3 6.0 5.6 5.5 5.0 
UK 5.0 4.8 4.9 5.4 5.7 5.8 
Poland 19.6 19.0 17.8 14.0 12.2 11.6 
Hungary 5.9 6.1 7.1 7.5 8.1 7.0 
Czech Rep 7.8 8.3 7.9 7.2 6.5 5.9 
Estonia 10.1 9.7 7.9 5.5 4.6 4.4 
Latvia 10.6 10.4 8.9 6.8 5.8 5.2 
Lithuania 12.5 11.4 8.3 5.9 6.2 6.1 
Slovakia 17.6 18.2 16.2 13.3 10.7 9.9 
Slovenia 6.7 6.3 6.5 6.0 5.0 5.0 
Romania 7.0 8.1 7.1 7.4 7.1 7.2 
Bulgaria 13.6 12.1 10.1 8.9 8.1 7.7 
Euro Area 8.7 8.8 8.6 7.8 7.2 6.8 
EU-15 8.0 8.1 7.9 7.4 6.9 6.6 
NMS-12 14.4 14.1 13.4 12.3 10.8 10.3 
EU-27 9.0 9.1 8.7 7.9 7.3 7.0 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
2. EUROPEAN POLICY 
MONITORING 
Against the background of the recovery, the European Central Bank has 
tightened its policy again this year. At the beginning of March, the key interest 
rate (the minimum bid rate in the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations) 
was raised to 3.75 percent. This was in line with market expectations because 
money market rates had risen since the previous hike last December. By mid-
March 2007, the 3-month EURIBOR went up to 3.9 percent. The real short-
term interest rate, calculated as the difference between the nominal rate and 
core inflation, rose slightly to approximately 2 percent which is roughly 
equivalent to the historical average. Bond yields which had risen until the 
summer of 2006 have moved only very little and remained close to 4 percent 
since then. In real terms, long-term rates are slightly below their long-term 
average independent of the inflation measure used; for example, inflationary 
expectations, approximated by the ten-year break-even inflation rate for 
bonds, are close to 2 percent. The international competitiveness of exporters 
in the Euro Area has changed only modestly in the past six months. While the 
euro appreciated strongly against the Japanese yen, the other bilateral 
exchange rates have hardly moved. Therefore, in real and effective terms 
(EER-44, CPI basis), the external value of the euro remained roughly 
constant. One reason for monetary tightening has been the strong expansion 
of monetary and credit aggregates. M3 growth has accelerated since the 
middle of 2004 and reached more than 9 ½ percent in the beginning of this 
year. Credits to the private sector expanded at rates well above 10 percent 
although there has been some deceleration in recent months. Until the end of 
February, monetary conditions were positively affected by the continued 
increase of stock prices. However, a correction set in after that. 
2.1 
Monetary Policy 
in the Euro Area 
 
All in all, monetary conditions have deteriorated slightly in recent months. 
This in confirmed by the so-called monetary conditions index (MCI) which is 
a combination of real interest rates adjusted for trend growth of real GDP and 
the detrended real effective exchange rate (Figure 2.1). The index has 
deteriorated somewhat since the end of last year, after a period of about two 
years with improving conditions. In comparison, monetary conditions in the 
US have deteriorated already since the beginning of 2005 when the Fed 
started to raise the target for the Federal Funds rate. However, since inflation 
went up as well, the increase of the interest rate component is not so strong; 
in addition, long-term rates which are also included in the MCI presented here 
did not increase very much. 
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Figure 2.1: Monetary Conditions for the Euro Area and the US 
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Notes: The index is calculated as: 1*Interest rate component+ 0.2*Exchange 
rate component.  
*1991–2005 average; component weighted according to its weight in the index 
(0.2); **Average of long-term and short-term interest rates less annual 
consumer price inflation less smoothed GDP growth. 
Sources: OECD, national sources, own estimates. 
 
We expect that the ECB will raise rates further in the near future. The key 
interest rate will reach 4 percent in the summer and remain there until the end 
of 2008. This projection is supported by our estimate of a forward looking 
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Taylor rule.1 According to our forecast, overall capacity utilization in the Euro 
Area will increase further, and according to the Professional Forecasters, the 
inflation rate will be near 2 percent. Assuming that the ECB will behave in the 
same fashion as in the past, the key interest rate will probably be raised to 4 
percent. 
 
In fact, the ECB signaled at the beginning of March that interest rates may 
have to go up further. This seems to be compatible with the forecast 
mentioned above. One reason is that the economic outlook for the Euro Area 
has continued to improve. This is also reflected in the Eurosystem staff 
macroeconomic projections (Table 2.1). The forecast for real GDP growth in 
2007 is now 2.5 percent. In contrast, the inflation forecast was revised 
downwards in the light of recent developments.2  This is mainly due to 
revisions of the assumption concerning the oil price. For example, while the 
September 2006 forecast was based on an oil price of 77.6 $ per barrel, the 
assumption is now 59.9 $. While this should not affect the outlook for the 
core rate of inflation, this measure might, according to the ECB, increase due 
to the wage pressure following the strong upturn of economic activity and the 
improvement on the labor market. Therefore, the ECB will probably tighten 
its policy stance once more this year. 
 
Table 2.1: Eurosystem Staff Macroeconomic Projections for the Euro Areaa 
Date Real GDP Growth HICP Inflation
June 2006  1.8 2.2 
September 2006 2.1 2.4 
December 2006 2.2 2.0 
March 2007 2.5 1.8 
aMiddle of the respective confidence bands (percentage change over previous 
year). 
Source: ECB, Monthly Bulletin, various issues. 
 
At a level of 4 percent, the key interest rate will be lower than at the peak of 
the previous interest rate cycle. In 2000, the key rate was raised to 4.75 
percent. We do not expect such a high rate for several reasons: First, the 
previous economic boom was stronger than we anticipate today, so the output 
gap was considerably higher at that time; second, most estimates suggest that 
the steady state risk free real interest rate is currently lower than at the 
beginning of this decade.  
 
2.2 Fiscal Policy 
in the Euro Area 
The outlook for public finances improved in the euro area in 2006 more 
rapidly than expected one year or even six months ago, both in Member States 
Stability programmes updates (SPs) and by EUROFRAME-EFN institutes. 
The improvement reflects partly higher than expected GDP growth and partly 
stronger than expected fiscal tightening and/or unusually high revenues. The 
improvement of the outlook both in terms of GDP growth and government 
deficit was especially striking in Germany. 
 
                                                 
1 See Box 2.1 in the Autumn 2006 Report. 
2 Since June 2006 the ECB publishes the projections under the technical assumption that 
important variables such as interest rates and the oil price will behave according to market 
expectations given at a particular cut-off date. For example, the 3-month EURIBOR rate is 
assumed to average 4.2 percent in 2007.  
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The fiscal stance has been contractionary at the euro area level over the last 
years, mainly in countries running deficits. We expect the euro area fiscal 
stance to remain slightly contractionary in 2007 and 2008 albeit to a smaller 
extent than before. The general pattern of countries running deficits 
implementing fiscal contraction in order to meet the rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact will remain, perhaps with the exception of France, ahead of 
general elections this year. Fiscal policies will remain in general neutral or 
slightly expansionary in countries running surpluses. 
 
This chapter considers euro area fiscal prospects in the light of the updates of 
the Stability programmes (SPs) released at the turn of the year. We will 
address successively: GDP growth scenarios, deficits targets and the fiscal 
stance in the euro area.  
 
 GROWTH PROSPECTS   
Euro area GDP grew by 2.8 per cent in 2006 (working day adjusted, 2.6 
unadjusted) instead of 2.6 expected in our EUROFRAME-EFN forecast six 
months ago. This brings euro area growth at the highest pace since 2001. 
Growth was higher than anticipated mainly in Germany (2.9 per cent, working 
day adjusted, instead of 2.4 expected in our last Autumn forecast). Growth 
was also higher for Italy (1.9 instead of 1.6) although this is due mainly to an 
unexpectedly high growth in the fourth quarter of the year.  
 
The EUROFRAME-EFN Spring 2007 forecast expects euro area GDP to 
grow by 2.5 per cent this year and by 2.3 next year (see Table 1.1). For 2007, 
our forecast is higher than in the SPs where euro area GDP is expected to 
grow by 2.1 per cent only. Our upward revision to the GDP forecast reflects 
partly a carry over effect of the high GDP growth figures registered in several 
countries at the end of 2006. We expect only one country to grow much more 
rapidly than announced in the SP this year: Germany (by 2.7 per cent instead 
of 1.8 in the SP). 
 
For 2008, the euro area GDP growth forecast derived from the SPs is similar 
to ours, at around 2.2 per cent. This contrasts with previous years when SPs 
looked optimistic at the euro area level as compared with EUROFRAME-
EFN and most forecasts.  
 
The macroeconomic scenarios of the last SPs updates are judged broadly 
realistic by EUROFRAME-EFN for most euro area countries. A major 
exception is Germany where we think the SP is pessimistic in terms of GDP 
and potential output growth for the coming years. We expect German GDP 
to grow by 2.6 per cent3 this year and by 2.5 per cent next year, substantially 
more rapidly than the annual 1.8 per cent considered in the German SP. The 
assumption of potential output growth is also judged pessimistic by the 
EUROFRAME-EFN institutes: the German SP considers a potential growth 
of 1.5 per cent, while the estimate of the Kiel Institute is now close to 2 per 
cent, slightly below the NiGEM’s trend output estimate. 
 
Differences of view on other countries are smaller. The Italian SPs is judged 
pessimistic in terms of GDP growth for this year, where we expect GDP to 
grow by 1.7 per cent, instead of 1.3 per cent in the SPs. It should be noted 
                                                 
3 Non adjusted from working days. 
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however that our forecast includes a positive carry over effect of the high 
growth of the last quarter of 2006 released after the SPs. We also expect 
Dutch GDP to grow more rapidly in 2008 than announced in the SP (2.7 
instead of 1.8), while we are slightly less optimistic for smaller and fast 
growing economies.  
 
Table 2.2. Euro area GDP growth and general government balances according to the stability 
programmes 
 GDP growth assumptions (per cent) General government balance (per cent of GDP) 
 Stability Programmes Actual Stability Programmes Actual
 J99 J00 J01 J02 J03 J04 J05 J06 J07  J99 J00 J01 J02 J03 J04 J05 J06 J07
98 2.8      2.8 -2.1 -1.9        -2.3 
99 2.5 2.2     2.8 -1.7 -1.4 -1.2       -1.3 
00 2.6 2.8 3.3    3.9 -1.5 -1.1 -0.7 -0.8      -1.0 
01 2.6 2.5 3.1 1.7 1.5  1.9 -1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -1.2 -1.6     -1.8 
02  2.5 2.9 1.9 1.0  0.9  -0.6 -0.3 -0.9 -2.2     -2.6 
03  2.5 2.8 2.6 2.1 0.6 0.8  -0.2 0.0 -0.5 -1.8 -2.7   -3.1 
04   2.8 2.6 2.6 1.9 2.0 1.8   0.4 0.1 -1.1 -2.4 -2.7  -2.8 
05    2.6 2.6 2.5 2.3 1.4 1.3 1.5    0.3 -0.6 -1.8 -2.3 -2.6 -2.4 -2.4 
06     2.6 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.5 2.81     -0.2 -1.3 -1  -2.8 .4 -2.0 -1.81
07      2.5 2.4 2.0 2.1 2.51      -0.9 .3 .9 -1.4 -1.31 -1  -1
1. EUROFRAME-EFN, Spring 2007 Forecast.  GDP figures are shown here working 
day adjusted. Unadjusted figures are resp. 2.6 in 2006, 2.5 in 2007, 2.3 in 2008. 
08       2.4 2.2 2.2 2.21       -1.0 -1.4 -1.1 -1.11
09       2.2 2.2 –        -0.9 -0.6 – 
10       2.2 –         -0.1 – 
 
Sources: EUROFRAME-EFN, Stability programmes, Eurostat, own calculations. 
 
DEFICIT TARGETS 
Government balances improved more rapidly than expected in a number of 
area countries in 2006. We now expect the euro area deficit to have reached 
1.8 per cent of GDP in 2006, instead of 2.0 in our Autumn forecast. 
Meanwhile, our GDP forecast has been revised only marginally upwards (by 
0.2 percentage point).  
 
At country level, one of the most unexpected improvements at the euro area 
level took place in Germany, where the government deficit is now assumed to 
have reached 1.7 per cent of GDP in 2006, versus 2.4 in our six month ago 
forecast. On the basis of an average revenues to GDP elasticity of 1, higher 
than expected growth can be said to have reduced the Euro Area government 
deficit-to-GDP ratio by only 0.1 percentage points. Higher than expected 
growth may explain only 0.25 percentage point of GDP improvement in the 
German budget ratio.  
 
The non-cyclical improvement of government balances has been higher than 
we expected in 2006 for several euro area countries. It is difficult to 
disentangle at this stage the improvement resulting from more contractionary 
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than announced fiscal measures and from a higher than usual elasticity of 
revenues to GDP. We plan to address this issue more in depth in our next 
Autumn report, when more information is available on public finances. Box 1 
provides an illustration of developments in Germany as concerns capital 
income taxation and VAT income tax in the last year. The stronger than 
expected rise in tax revenues was also particularly significant in Italy, where it 
may reflect partly the effect of anti tax evasion measures and an improvement 
in tax compliance (see Section on Italy in this report). The improvement in the 
fiscal balance does not show at first glance, since the observed deficit 
increased from 4.1 per cent of GDP in 2006 to 4.4 per cent in 2007. But 
excluding exceptional measures, namely the refund of the VAT on motor 
vehicles (1.2 per cent of GDP) and the inclusion of liabilities linked the 
funding of the rail network system (0.9 per cent of GDP), the deficit has 
indeed improved in 2006 to 2.3 per cent of GDP, well below the target of the 
SP. 
 
Box 2 : Higher than expected revenues in 2006: the example of Germany 
The rise in tax revenues was much stronger than nominal GDP in 2006 and 
much stronger than anybody had expected. Tax revenues rose by 8 percent (in 
cash basis), while nominal GDP increased by 3 percent only. After having 
declined early in this decade, the tax ratio rose by 1 percentage point. It 
reached the level which had been “normal” in the 1990s. 
 
The increase in capital income taxation (corporate income tax, assessed income 
tax, withholding tax on dividends and interest income) was very high in 2006 
(Figure A). Besides, the revenues of the Gewerbesteuer (tax on profits and on 
parts of interest paid by firms) in 2006 were 19 percent higher than in 2005. 
VAT revenues rose more rapidly than private consumption, their most 
important determinant (Figure B).  
 
Figure A: Capital Income Tax Revenues in Germany 2000–2007 
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Source: Ministry of Finance. 
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Figure B: Private Consumptiona and VAT Revenuesa in Germany 2000-2007 
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a Seasonally Adjusted 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank.  
 
The reason why tax revenues surged in 2006 is not clear up to now. There are 
only some tentative elements of explanation: 
 
- The upswing was probably stronger than currently indicated by national 
accounts data. This refers to the sum of wages as well as to company profits 
and households consumption. 
- Taxable incomes and profits were higher than expected due to an 
underestimation of the effects of tax base broadening measures (e.g. 
restrictions to carry losses forward) which had been decided upon in recent 
years. 
- Due to the lag structure of assessed taxes there was a reaction on the 
disappointing development of tax revenues in the period 2002–2004. 
 
- As a result of the upswing the number of insolvent firms went down. Thus, 
losses of VAT revenues probably were much smaller than in the previous 
years. 
 
Overall, the development of tax revenues in 2006 may have been a reaction 
after poor developments in the period 2002–2005. We do not assume that 
there will be a further strong increase of tax revenues in 2007 and 2008, apart 
from the usual influence of cyclical factors. 
 
Deficit targets announced in the SPs will be met at the euro area level in 2006 
(1.8 per cent of GDP versus 2.0 announced), and in all euro area countries. 
This leaves 3 countries with deficits above the 3% of GDP threshold: Italy, 
Portugal and Greece (see Table 2.4).  
 
Deficits targets will also be met, or more than met, in the forecasting horizon 
under our assumptions, with one major exception: France. We expect the 
deficit to remain at around 2.8 per cent both in 2007 and 2008, rather than to 
decrease to 1.8 (see below). The German deficit will come close to 0 per cent 
of GDP in 2008 (versus -1.5 per cent in the SP). The Italian deficit will stand 
at 2.2 per cent, in line with the SPs.  Portugal and Greece will bring their 
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deficit slightly below 3%, which would leave no country under an excessive 
deficit procedure in the euro area.  
EXPECTED FISCAL STANCE 
The fiscal stance associated with our forecast is slightly contractionary both in 
2007 and 2008 at the euro area level. The assessment of the fiscal stance 
depends not only on GDP growth and government balances, but also on 
potential growth estimates that may vary significantly from one method to 
another.  
 
Table 2.3 shows the fiscal stance as in the SPs. Table 2.4 shows two estimates 
of the fiscal stance in the euro area, based on our forecasts for GDP and 
government deficits. The first measure uses potential output growth taken 
from the SP’s, leading to a potential growth close to 2% for the euro area as 
whole. The second measure uses NiGEM estimates that suggest euro area 
trend output has been accelerating in recent years from 1.6 per cent in 2003 to 
2.1 per cent in 2006, mainly under the effect of a more rapid German trend 
output. At the country level, Germany is currently a major case for uncertainty 
in terms of potential output growth. The recent German economic 
acceleration of growth has led to upwards revisions of German potential 
output growth, now assumed to be closer to 2 percent than the 1.5 percent 
underlying the German SP projections.   
 
The fiscal stances associated with the two measures are given to provide some 
bounds of the fiscal stance underway in the euro area. Under both measures, 
the contraction is smaller than anticipated in the SPs at the euro area level: 
close to 0.2 per cent of GDP each year, versus 0.5 in the SPs. However, the 
fiscal stance is close to that of the SPs for most countries, and with two major 
exceptions: Italy and France. In Italy, we expect the fiscal stance to be less 
restrictive than announced in the SP this year. This is because part of the 
contractionary measures announced for 2007 seem to have already impacted 
revenues in 2006. In France, the SPs update anticipates a contractionary fiscal 
stance of 0.4 percentage point of GDP in 2007 and 0.7 in 2008, which is in 
line with the annual 0.5 percentage point of GDP reduction in deficit 
requested for countries running deficits. However, we expect government 
spending to rise more rapidly than announced in the last update of the SP up 
to 2008 (by close to 2 per cent in real terms rather than 0.6 per cent in the SP). 
At the end of March 2007, forecasts for fiscal plans are however highly 
uncertain in the prospect of the presidential elections to held in late April 
followed by parliamentary elections in June. We expect only a slight fiscal 
tightening in 2008, which would leave the government deficit close to 2.8 per 
cent of GDP in both years. 
 
Over the forecast horizon, we expect the fiscal stance to be restrictive in all 
countries running higher than 3% of GDP deficits. Fiscal policy will remain 
contractionary this year in Germany and become almost neutral next year. It 
will be neutral or slightly expansionary in countries running already close to or 
in surplus balances (Spain, Finland, Ireland). 
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Table 2.3: GDP growth, fiscal balances and fiscal impulses in the updates of 
the stability programmes, end 2006 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Real GDP growth, per cent 
Germany 0,9 2,3 1,4 1,8 1,8 1,8 
France 1,2 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3 
Italy 0,0 1,6 1,3 1,5 1,6 1,7 
Spain 3,5 3,8 3,4 3,3 3,3 3,3* 
The Netherlands 1,5 3,3 3,0 1,8 1,8 1,8* 
Belgium 1,2 2,7 2,2 2,1 2,2 2,2 
Austria - - - - - - 
Finland 2,9 4,5 3,0 2,9 2,6 2,1 
Portugal 0,4 1,4 1,8 2,4 3,0 3,0 
Greece 3,7 4,0 3,9 4,0 4,1 4,1* 
Ireland 5,5 5,4 5,7 5,3 4,6 4,3* 
Luxemburg 4,0 5,5 4,0 5,0 4,0 4,0* 
Euro area 1,3 2,5 2,1 2,2 2,2 2,2 
General government balance, per cent of GDP 
Germany -3,2 -2,1 -1,5 -1,5 -1,0 -0,5 
France -2,9 -2,7 -2,5 -1,8 -0,9 0,0 
Italy -4,1 -4,8 -2,8 -2,2 -1,5 -0,7 
Spain 1,1 1,4 1,0 0,9 0,9 0,9* 
The Netherlands -0,3 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,9 0,9* 
Belgium 0,1 0,0 0,3 0,5 0,7 0,9 
Austria  - - - - - 
Finland 2,5 2,9 2,8 2,7 2,7 2,4 
Portugal -6,0 -4,6 -3,7 -2,6 -1,5 -0,4 
Greece -5,2 -2,6 -2,4 -1,8 -1,2 -0.6* 
Ireland 1,1 2,3 1,2 0,9 0,6 0,3* 
Luxemburg -1,0 -1,5 -0,9 -0,4 0,1 0,1* 
Euro area -2,4 -2,0 -1,4 -1,1 -0,6 -0,1 
Fiscal impulse, per cent of GDP (1)
Germany   -0,7 -0,7 0,1 -0,4 -0,4 
France  -0,4 -0,4 -0,7 -0,9 -0,9 
Italy  0,1 -1,4 -0,6 -0,7 -0,8 
Spain  0,0 0,5 0,0 -0,1 -0,1* 
The Netherlands  0,0 0,4 -0,2 -1,0 0,2* 
Belgium  0,9 -0,7 -0,2 -0,1 -0,1 
Austria  - - - - - 
Finland  0,3 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,3 
Portugal  -2,3 -1,1 -0,9 -0,6 -0,6 
Greece  -1,8 -0,5 -0,6 -0,6 -0,6* 
Ireland  -1,4 1,3 0,4 0,4 0.2* 
Luxemburg  1,1 -0,8 -0,2 -0,7 -0,2* 
Euro area   -0,4 -0,5 -0,3 -0,5 -0,5 
(1) The fiscal impulse is estimated here as the opposite of the change in the cyclically-adjusted 
primary balance, as estimated by the SP and excluding one-off measures. One-off measures can 
be seen in Table 2.4. The latter are in line with SPs estimates, and differ for Italy in 2006 (-0.5% 
of GDP) from our own estimate (-1.3% of GDP).  
*Own assumptions. 
Austria had released no SPs update yet in March 2007. 
Sources: Stability programmes, Seventh updates, end 2006, own assumptions. 
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Table 2.4. GDP growth, fiscal balances in the EUROFRAME-EFN forecast and 
fiscal impulses under two estimates 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Real GDP growth, per cent 
Germany (1) 0.8 0.9 2.7 2.6 2.5 
France 2.0 1.2 2.0 2.2 2.0 
Italy 1.0 0.2 1.9 1.7 1.4 
Spain 3.2 3.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 
The Netherlands 2.0 1.5 2.9 2.6 2.7 
Belgium 2.7 1.5 3.0 2.3 2.1 
Austria 2.3 2.6 3.3 3.0 2.6 
Finland 3.5 3.0 5.5 2.6 2.6 
Portugal 1.2 0.4 1.3 1.9 2.0 
Greece 4.7 3.7 4.3 3.4 3.5 
Ireland 4.3 5.5 6.2 5.1 4.0 
Euro area-11 (2) 1.7 1.4 2.6 2.5 2.3 
General government balance, per cent of GDP 
Germany -3,7 -3,2 -1,7 -0,5 -0,3 
France -3,7 -2,9 -2,8 -2,8 -2,7 
Italy -3,4 -4,1 -4,4 -2,5 -2,2 
Spain -0,2 1,1 1,4 0,8 0,6 
The Netherlands -1,8 -0,3 0,2 -0,1 0,7 
Belgium 0,0 -2,3 -0,5 -0,3 -0,3 
Austria -1,2 -1,5 -1,1 -1,0 -1,0 
Finland 2,3 2,7 3,9 3,5 3,3 
Portugal -3,2 -6,0 -4,5 -3,8 -2,9 
Greece -6,2 -4,2 -3,7 -3,1 -2,6 
Ireland 1,5 1,0 2,2 1,8 1,5 
Euro area-11 -2,8 -2,4 -1,8 -1,2 -1,0 
One-off measures, per cent of GDP 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 
France 0.1 0.5 0.0 0 0 
Italy 1.2 0.5 -1.3 0.1 0.1 
Spain -0.7 0 0 0 0 
The Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 0.0 0.4 0.6 0 0 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0 0.3 0.4 
Portugal 2.3 0.2 0 0 0 
Greece 0.0 0.0 0.6 0 0 
Ireland 0.5 -0.4 -0.2 0 0 
Euro area-11  0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 
Fiscal impulse, under SP potential output growth assumptions, per cent of GDP (3)
Germany  -0,6 -0,8 -0,9 -0,6 0,3 
France -0,5 -0,9 -0,7 0,1 -0,2 
Italy -0,5 -0,4 -1,4 -0,4 -0,3 
Spain -0,3 -0,4 0,1 0,6 0,0 
The Netherlands -1,1 -1,4 0,1 0,7 -0,5 
Belgium 0,9 2,4 -0,4 -0,6 0,0 
Austria 0,0 0,7 0,4 0,4 0,3 
Finland 0,4 -0,5 -0,2 0,5 0,2 
Portugal -0,2 -0,1 -2,5 -0,8 -0,9 
Greece 3,9 -1,7 0,7 -1,2 -0,8 
Ireland -1,5 -0,6 -0,9 0,3 -0,3 
Euro area-11 -0,4 -0,6 -0,7 -0,2 -0,1 
Fiscal impulse, under NiGEM trend output growth assumptions, per cent of GDP (4)
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Germany  -0,4 -0,8 -1,0 -0,8 0,0 
France -0,3 -0,7 -0,5 0,3 0,0 
Italy -0,2 -0,1 -1,3 -0,4 -0,4 
Spain -0,2 -0,3 0,1 0,7 0,2 
The Netherlands -1,2 -1,3 0,1 0,6 -0,7 
Belgium 0,8 2,5 -0,4 -0,5 0,0 
Austria -0,1 0,6 0,1 0,2 0,0 
Finland 0,3 -0,4 -0,3 0,5 0,0 
Portugal 0,5 0,6 -2,0 -0,5 -0,8 
Greece 1,6 -1,6 0,6 -1,0 -0,5 
Ireland -0,9 -0,2 -0,3 0,7 -0,1 
Euro area-11 -0,3 -0,4 -0,7 -0,2 -0,1 
(1) Not working day adjusted.  (2) Excluding Luxembourg and Slovenia. (3) Excluding one-off 
measures. Fiscal impulse is the opposite of the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, 
derived from EUROFRAME-EFN forecasts for GDP growth, fiscal balances and one-off 
measures, with potential output growth as in the stability programmes. (4) Excluding one-off 
measures. Fiscal impulse here is the opposite of the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary 
balance, derived from EUROFRAME-EFN forecasts for GDP growth, fiscal balances and one-
off measures, with trend output growth as in NiGEM 
Sources: EUROFRAME-EFN Spring 2007 forecast, Stability programmes, seventh updates, end 
2006, Eurostat, own assumptions 
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 The high level of unemployment remains one of the major concerns of 
economic policy. Labour market figures in many European countries are 
unsatisfactory although they improved significantly during the recent cyclical 
upswing.  
1.  
Introduction 
High unemployment is not a European trait. Until the 1980s, 
unemployment rates in Europe were lower than in the US. Over the last two 
decades, unemployment rates in the Euro area  have remained at a very high 
level. 
Most economists and international organisations explained high 
unemployment in Europe first by shocks, then by rigid labour market 
institutions (OECD, 1994). To reduce unemployment would require labour 
market reforms such as abating unemployment benefits, making wage costs 
more flexible downwards, cutting taxes on labour and easing labour dismissals. 
In the reassessment of the Jobs Study, the OECD took the edge off its original 
recommendations and concluded that various combinations of labour market 
institutions are suited to promote employment (OECD, 2006A).  
A report  by five Euroframe institutes highlighted the role of labour market 
institutions and gave some estimates of the equilibrium rate of unemployment 
(IfW et al., 2002). In the special EFN-report presented here the relationship 
between growth, employment and unemployment is explored from different 
view points in order to develop adequate strategies to reduce unemployment. 
The report combines recent studies from all Euroframe institutes. 
Over the past decade, the trend increase in unemployment has been 
arrested in the Euro area. Labour market performance has improved 
significantly for older workers and for women (due to more part-time jobs), 
but not for younger people and the low skilled. The number of full-time jobs 
has not increased since 2000. The lack of full-time jobs hits particularly young 
entrants; the unemployment rate of young people is three times as high as that 
of the prime-age population. 
This picture masks, however, large differences across countries. Fast 
growing economies were able to reduce unemployment rates rapidly during the 
last decade, in particular Ireland, Spain, Scandinavia and the United Kingdom. 
Unemployment in Germany and France, on the other hand, remained 
stubbornly high. In Italy and Spain, the decline in unemployment from very 
high levels was much stronger than could be expected from economic 
developments. Labour market flexibility – especially low-wage contracts for 
high-skilled young people –  played a crucial, but not undisputed role 
(“1,000 € generation”). Labour productivity stagnated in these two countries, 
which cannot be a strategy for long. 
The Scandinavian welfare states and the Anglo-American market 
economies, assisted by soaring house prices, were coping much better with 
economic and employment problems during the last decade than continental 
Europe. The reduction of unemployment was higher than could be expected 
from the development of employment. This suggests that successful measures 
were implemented to bring the unemployed back to work: particularly 
activation policies in Scandinavia and in-work benefits in the UK.  
In a panel study of 15 EU countries, the effect of GDP growth on the 
evolution of employment and unemployment was investigated.  (The impact of 
labour market institutions was the topic of another study by some Euroframe 
institutes – see IfW et al., 2002). Over the period 1995 to 2005, about two- 
thirds of the variation in employment can be explained by economic growth. 
The effect of GDP growth on employment is not linear, but concave: At low 
economic growth rates, the reaction of employment is stronger – obviously 
due to the ample supply of labour which is pushed into low-wage jobs. At high 
growth rates, the reaction of employment flattens, because labour becomes 
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scarce. In such a situation, productivity per employee grows more rapidly due 
to more overtime worked and heightened labour intensity. 
Real wages have a significant but rather small effect in the employment 
equation; low-wage jobs for young people appear to play an important role in 
this respect. Another significant determinant of employment is the structure of 
production and demand. A rising share of exports tends to dampen 
employment growth due to the high capital intensity of manufacturing exports; 
a rising share of consumption (services) tends to raise employment growth. 
Poor labour market developments in export-oriented Germany and a good 
performance in the service-oriented United Kingdom may underpin these 
findings.  
The lags between growth and employment were also investigated. On 
average, in EU countries employment is lagging three-quarters behind GDP 
growth. This is a clear indication that growth is primarily important for 
employment, not the other way round. However, in countries with high GDP 
growth and shortages of skilled labour (Ireland, Spain), there was no lag 
between growth and employment. This suggests that in these countries labour 
supply was the crucial limiting factor for growth. In the majority of countries, 
however, weak economic growth was limiting the expansion of employment in 
the period 1995 to 2005.  
The effect of economic growth on the evolution of unemployment rates 
was also highly significant for the period 1995 to 2005: 50 per cent of the 
variation of the unemployment rates could be explained by economic growth, 
15 per cent by the development of the population in the working age. Thus, 
economic growth affects not only employment, but also unemployment in the 
medium term. A decline in the working-age population tends to put a break on 
growth and employment, but it alleviates the unemployment situation. The fall 
in the working-age population, expected for the next decades, will thus tend to 
reduce the unemployment rate. This coincides with NiGEM results that a 
supply shock from immigration may add to unemployment until wages react.  
In the EU15, the close relationship between GDP growth and the lagged 
change in the unemployment rate ('Okun's law') holds also for the longer 
period 1980-2005 (see Figure 1). In this period, the unemployment rate 
remained constant at a GDP growth rate of 2.3 per cent. An increase of GDP 
growth above this rate by 1 percentage point resulted in a decline of the 
unemployment rate by 0.6 percentage point. 
Figure 1: GDP growth and unemployment in the EU15, 1980 - 2005
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The Lisbon strategy for more and better jobs aims at raising the growth and 
employment potential by increasing productivity and improving labour market 
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performance. The Lisbon strategy shifted the emphasis from unemployment to 
employment rates. The targeted rise in the employment rate implies an 
increase in labour force participation and a reduction of unemployment. Over 
the last decade, rising employment rates in the Euro area did not result in 
higher GDP growth – as expected by most economists – since they were 
matched by lower productivity increases. This may be explained by increasing 
part-time work, a rising low wage/productivity sector and by Europe's lag in 
ICT use in services. The rationale behind the Lisbon process is that 
technological progress is neutral and there is no long-run trade–off between 
employment and productivity. The study in Annex 1 confirms this view for 
most EU countries with the exception of the UK and the Netherlands. Only in 
the UK and the Netherlands where there appears to be a long-run trade-off. 
 
Figure 2: Employment rates in the EU15 in 2005
Percent of population aged 15-64
Source: Eurostat.
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The levels of unemployment rates should be interpreted very cautiously in 
international comparisons since they are affected by the social benefit systems. 
Relatively low rates of open unemployment may be achieved by:  
- early retirement schemes; 
- generous invalidity systems; 
- family and educational leave while keeping  one’s job; 
- fiscal incentives for marginal jobs (more than one hour per 
week, one Euro jobs). 
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Figure 3: Unemployment rates in the EU15 in 2006
Percent of Labour Force
Source: Eurostat.
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In Austria, Belgium and Italy the unemployment rate is dampened by 
extremely high early retirement rates, dismissals are concentrated on older 
workers. The employment rate of older persons (55-64 years) is only about 30 
per cent in these countries. In Austria, about 5 per cent of the labour force are 
unemployed according to Eurostat definitions, another 5 per cent make up 
their living by payments from the labour market service (seasonally 
unemployed, trained and sick unemployed etc.) and another 7 per cent receive 
early retirement pensions.  Early retirement is an inadequate policy instrument; 
it restricts particularly the supply of qualified labour in a following cyclical 
upswing. In the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands employment rates 
are driven up by very high rates of disability and sickness. In Denmark, praised 
for the flexicurity model, the share of the working-age population living on 
social benefits was as high as in Germany and France (at least up to 2000). In 
the UK and Ireland a rather small share of  the population lives on 
unemployment benefits, but a rather large share on welfare payments. 
Labour market institutions (employment protection, temporary contracts, 
bargaining systems, replacement rates, etc.) are very important to explain 
differences between unemployment across countries. But as Blanchard (2005, 
p.21) points out, their explanatory power for the development of 
unemployment is rather limited.  
The crucial role of labour market institutions is: 
- to remove barriers to employment; 
- to raise the 'production ceiling', i.e. to increase production beyond a 
certain level without inflationary pressures; 
- to distribute the burden of unemployment between enterprises, 
individuals and different parts of the welfare system. 
 
  ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF  THE EURO AREA 49 
 
Figure 4:  Individuals receiving a welfare benefit
Percentage of the working age population in 1999
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2003
Countries shown in ascending order of benefit dependency rates.
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There appears to be a positive empirical relationship between the level of 
GDP per head and employment. This may be explained primarily by the 
higher participation rate of women in rich countries, reflecting the higher 
education of women and cultural factors. The level of employment rates is 
influenced by non-economic factors; a low female employment rate is not 
necessarily indicating labour market problems for women. The relationship 
between GDP per head and the unemployment rate is even more pronounced. 
Rich countries can afford to prevent open unemployment by labour market 
and social policies.  
Unemployment rates for unskilled and low-wage workers have been high 
in many Euro area countries. This is the result of globalisation, new 
technologies, poor working conditions in these jobs and little financial 
incentives to start work. Moreover, in a situation of high unemployment, 
graduate workers will apply for jobs for which they are over skilled; they may 
squeeze out the unskilled, but it is difficult to find empirical evidence to back 
this. 
Special strategies were developed to reduce low skilled unemployment. In a 
nutshell: most continental countries primarily tried to reduce the firms' labour 
costs for low-wage jobs (e.g. by cuts in social security contributions, One-
Euro-jobs etc.). The Anglo-American countries gave the unemployed an 
incentive to work (through earned income tax credits and minimum wages), 
and the Scandinavian countries successfully implemented activation strategies 
on the principle of mutual obligations.  
In many continental countries, social security cuts and employment 
subsidies were used to reduce unemployment. In Germany, the Hartz reforms 
were implemented, in France there were several cuts in social security 
contributions for low-wage groups. It appears that cuts in social security 
contributions for low-wage jobs are costly, particularly in countries with rather 
equal income distribution. But once adopted as in France, such measures can 
hardly be eliminated without substantial negative effects on employment. 
According to the analysis given in Annex 6, vouchers for targeted unemployed 
seem to be a useful instrument. 
An increase in labour supply will normally be absorbed by the labour 
market, thus increasing economic growth and employment. But with lack of 
demand or “overshooting” supply shocks (e.g. by immigration) there is a risk 
of rising unemployment.  The past few years have seen a growing debate on 
the question of migration, particularly in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain 
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and Austria. In the case of immigration, wages should be expected to fall and 
the return on capital to rise. If wages are sticky downwards due to minimum 
wages and collective agreements, an expansion of the labour force may lead to 
an increase in unemployment, particularly if the immigrants are young workers 
in low-skill occupations. Simulations with NIGEM for the UK suggest that a 
gradual rise in the labour force of ¾ per cent over 2-3 years leads to a 
temporary increase in unemployment of ¼ percentage point for a  few years, 
with unemployment gradually disappearing as/if wages adjust. It is an open 
question whether low-skill wages will react with given minimum wage 
regulations. 
 
 The Lisbon strategy has addressed the two issues – growth and jobs – jointly. 
It replaced the strategy of increasing the employment content of growth by 
wage/productivity moderation. The underlying rationale of the Lisbon process 
is: “At any point in time, output and employment are determined by aggregate 
demand. Monetary and fiscal policy can be used to influence aggregate 
demand. But the level of sustainable demand depends on supply conditions in 
the economy” (Pichelmann, 2006). 
2.  
Growth and 
Employment 
Clearly, resource constraints set a limit to sustainable economic expansion. 
But demand conditions, on the other hand, set a limit to the utilisation of 
existing resources. “You need both pairs of scissors to cut” (Alfred Marshall). 
In the period 2001-2005 manufacturing capacities in the Euro area were 
underutilised (see Figure 5), about 9 per cent of the labour force were on the 
dole, many university graduates could only find jobs far below their 
qualifications (the “project generation” or the “1000 € generation”) , and many 
people were discouraged to look for work by given labour market conditions. 
An investment boom in the Euro area started when the "capacity threshold" 
was reached. Higher input of R&D can stimulate economic growth only if it is 
used in form of investment, and higher education can stimulate growth only if 
the acquired skills are fully utilised in the work process.  
Economic growth and unemployment are systematically negatively 
correlated over time and countries (see Zagler, 2004). According to the 
conventional textbook there should be no correlation at all between economic 
growth and unemployment: Growth will ultimately be determined by technical 
progress and the supply of labour. Unemployment will be determined by its 
natural rate, depending mainly on the replacement rate and the tax wedge. The 
fundamental determinants of unemployment are labour market institutions 
affecting the hiring and firing rate (IfW et al., 2002). 
Figure 5: Capacity utilisation in manufacturing in the Euro area
Percent
Source: Eurostat
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The Aghion-Howitt model of endogenous growth differs from the 
neoclassical textbook. It claims that growth is the cause of unemployment, not 
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vice versa. Growth reduces the equilibrium rate of unemployment by changing 
the incentives of workers to search and accept new offers, and by firms to post 
a vacancy. The hysteresis hypothesis, on the one hand, implies that changes in 
GDP growth account for permanent shifts in the unemployment rate; 
joblessness does not converge to a fixed equilibrium level (see Annex 10.1).  
Verdoorn first explored the relationship between output and productivity 
growth. He found a positive correlation, which he explained by increasing 
returns: faster output growth increases productivity, particularly in the 
manufacturing sector. Kaldor analysed the relationship between growth and 
unemployment, however “Okun's law” became the most famous.  Okun found 
that a 3 per cent increase in output growth is associated with a 1 per cent fall in 
the unemployment rate. In the end, the relationship between growth, 
employment and unemployment is an empirical question.  
2.1  EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE EU15 
In this chapter, the development of employment and unemployment in the 
EU15 is briefly reviewed. The differences across countries and their likely 
reasons are highlighted.  
Decline in Unemployment Rates since 1995 
In 2006, unemployment in the Euro area was considerably lower than in the 
mid-1990s. On average, the unemployment rate was 8 per cent in 2006, about 
2 percentage points below the 1995 level. The number of unemployed varied 
strongly over the cycle and across Euro area countries. In Ireland, Spain, the 
Netherlands and interestingly also Italy, unemployment in 2006 was much 
lower than in the mid-1990s. Whereas, in Germany, Austria, Portugal and 
Greece unemployment is today even higher than in 1995. The determinants of 
these developments will be explored in the following chapter. 
 
Figure 6: Unemployment rates in the large EU countries
Percent of Labour Force
Source: Eurostat.
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Rising Employment Rates 
Employment rates in the Euro area increased considerably during the period 
1995 to 2005: from 58 per cent to 63.6 per cent. In Spain, Greece, the 
Netherlands and Finland the increase was particularly strong. There have been 
only two countries with stagnating rates of employment: Germany and Austria. 
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Figure 7: Employment rates in the large EU countries
Percent of population aged 15-64
Source: Eurostat.
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The rise in the employment rate was mainly due to strongly increasing part-
time work and a rising low-wage sector (marketisation of household services 
and paid internships). 
Part-time Work and Full-time Equivalent  Employment Rates 
Part-time work is an increasing trend in the Euro area. In 1995, 13.7 per cent 
of all employed persons worked part time (less than 35 working hours a week), 
in 2005 their share was 18.9 per cent. Part-time work increased strongly in 
Italy, Austria, Belgium, and Germany and – from an already very high level – 
also in the Netherlands. This was primarily due to the effect of increasing 
numbers of women engaged in part-time work.  Only in the Netherlands did 
the part-time work of men increase significantly (see Chapter 2.6.2). 
Due to the increase in part-time work, the employment rates are over-
estimating the expansion of labour input. Employment rates at full-time 
equivalents (FTE) are one way to correct for this. However, these data are less 
reliable because of the poor quality of data on working time. In the Euro area, 
employment rates at full-time equivalents increased by about 3 percentage 
points between 1995 and 2005, much less than if uncorrected for working time 
(+5 percentage points). The growth of employment measured in full time 
equivalents was particularly strong in Spain, Ireland and Finland (not in the 
Netherlands). There are only two countries in which FTE employment rates 
declined in the last decade: Germany and Austria. 
The number of full-time jobs in the Euro area has been roughly constant 
since 2000, only part-time jobs increased sharply. There is a great structural 
mismatch: The number of part-time jobs is increasing, but the majority of the 
unemployed are seeking full-time jobs. The policy conclusion is: the 
competitiveness of the unemployed vis-à-vis part-time workers and new 
immigrants should be improved (by training, employment subsidies/vouchers 
etc.) to reduce fiscal expenditures on passive unemployment benefits. 
Table 1: Labour Market Indicators in 2005  
Per Cent Full-time equivalent Total  Part-time 
Employment 
Females Older 
Workers 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Denmark 68.1 75.9 22.1 71.9 59.5 4.8 
Sweden 66.0 72.5 24.7 70.4 69.4 7.8 
Portugal 65.9 67.5 11.2 61.7 50.5 7.6 
Finland  65.6 68.4 13.7 66.5 52.7 8.4 
Ireland 62.5 67.6 16.8 58.3 51.6 4.3 
United Kingdom 61.9 71.7 25.4 65.9 56.9 4.7 
Austria 60.7 68.6 21.1 62.0 31.8 5.2 
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Greece 59.5 60.1 5.0 46.1 41.6 9.8 
Spain 59.2 63.3 12.4 51.2 43.1 9.2 
Luxembourg 59.2 63.6 17.4 53.7 31.7 4.5 
France 58.5 63.1 17.2 57.6 37.9 9.7 
Germany 56.7 65.4 24.0 59.6 45.4 9.5 
Netherlands 56.4 73.2 46.1 66.4 46.1 4.7 
Belgium 56.3 61.1 22.0 53.8 31.8 8.4 
Italy 54.4 57.6 12.8 45.3 31.4 7.7 
Source: Eurostat, OECD, WIFO calculations. 
2.2 EFFECT OF GDP GROWTH ON EMPLOYMENT AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
An important factor that determines the evolution of employment and 
unemployment is economic growth. A look at a cross-section diagram of EU 
countries shows that those members of the EU with high economic growth 
rates enjoy a relatively attractive advance in employment, while employment 
tends to lag behind in those countries with slower growth rates (see Figure 8).  
The relation between GDP growth and employment since 1995 has been 
much closer than in the decades before. This is primarily the outcome of 
labour market flexibility in the form of the enormous increase in part-time and 
marginal jobs. Hours worked have been increasing much less than 
employment. The result has been a marked decline in officially measured 
labour productivity (output per head). 
 
Figure 8: GDP growth and  employment 1995 - 2005
Average year-to-year percentage changes
Source: Eurostat, OECD
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On average, labour productivity has been increasing by only about 1 per 
cent per year since 1995; this is less than half the rate of the decades before. 
High increases in labour productivity have only been experienced by the 
catching-up countries Slovenia, Greece, Ireland and by Finland. In Italy and 
Spain, official figures show a stagnation of productivity for a whole decade. 
This is partly explained by immigrant legislation, rising part-time work and an 
increasing low-wage sector for young people.  
The development of unemployment in the EU masks large differences 
across countries. Fast growing economies were able to reduce unemployment 
rates markedly during the last decade, in particular Ireland, Spain, Finland and 
the United Kingdom. Unemployment in Germany and Austria, on the other 
hand, has been even higher than ten years ago. A special country report is 
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devoted to Italy where labour market flexibility – especially short-term 
contracts for young people - played a crucial role. 
Economic growth also has a large influence on the development of 
unemployment. However, this influence is not as strong as that on 
employment, because unemployment is influenced by additional factors. These 
include, above all, the demographic trends in the working age population,  
replacement rates and labour market policy measures (training programmes, 
etc.). 
 
Figure 9: GDP growth and  unemployment 1995 - 2005
Source: Eurostat, OECD
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In Finland, Denmark and the United Kingdom, the reduction in 
unemployment was higher than should be expected from the evolution of 
employment. This suggests that successful measures to cut unemployment 
were implemented in these countries: e.g., activation of the unemployed in 
Denmark and Finland, in-work benefits in the UK.  
There appears to be a relationship between the level of GDP per head and 
the employment rate. This may be explained mainly by three factors: 
- high wealth requires financial services and gives room for health and 
care services; 
- the marketisation of household work is more pronounced in highly 
developed countries; 
- the participation rate of women is substantially higher in rich 
countries, reflecting higher education and cultural factors. 
The relationship between GDP per head and the unemployment rate is even 
closer. Rich countries have not only high employment rates of well-educated 
women, but they can also afford to avoid open unemployment by active labour 
market measures and social benefit systems (keeping the job in case of sickness 
and family care).  
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Figure 10: GDP per capita and employment in 2005
Source: Eurostat
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Figure 11: GDP per capita and unemployment in 2005
Source: Eurostat
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2.3   TIME LAGS BETWEEN GDP GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT 
Labour market time series are frequently referred to as lagging indicators in 
literature. The direction of the effect of growth and employment is a key issue: 
Does higher growth lead to higher employment with a certain time lag or do 
labour market reforms (lower wages and higher flexibility) lead to more 
employment and thus to higher growth? The analysis investigates the co-
movement and the cyclical correlation by determining cross-correlations as 
well as using Granger causality tests for each of the countries.  
The cross-correlations of the time series show the typical time lag of the 
reaction of employment to economic growth for almost all EU countries. In 
the EU, it takes on average around three quarters until employment fully reacts 
to economic developments. During an economic upswing, for example, at first 
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productivity increases through overtime work etc. The lag structures reflect the 
time needed and the costs that new hiring implicate for enterprises.  
Only in Ireland, Spain and Denmark did the two indicators develop in 
tandem. This can be explained by the benign economic development and the 
high capacity utilisation of the pool of available labour in these countries. 
When an economy is booming and operating at full capacity, the labour market 
factors play a decisive role for the further development of the economy. An 
increase in the supply of labour in this situation triggers an immediate rise in 
economic growth that would otherwise be checked by the scarcity of labour.  
 
2.4  FACTORS DETERMINING EMPLOYMENT AND  
UNEMPLOYMENT  
The effect of economic growth, real wages and demand structures on 
employment is analysed with the help of a panel regression for Europe. 
The data used for the estimation were taken from a cross-section of the 
EU15 over a period of 13 years (1992-2004). Due to the sharp increase in part-
time employment over the past few years, employment is measured in full-time 
equivalents. National factors are taken into account using country-specific 
constant terms (fixed effects). The endogenous variable is the relative change 
in full-time equivalent employees. The determinants investigated were relative 
economic growth, the relative change in real wages and the absolute change in 
the share of consumption and exports in GDP1. As described in the preceding 
section, employment adjusts to economic growth with a time lag. This dynamic 
development must be considered in the estimates. Two models were calculated 
for this investigation. Model (I) is a static panel with fixed effects (LSDV) that 
includes GDP growth lagged by one period as an additional explanatory 
variable. Model (II) is a dynamic panel estimated with a corrected LSDV 
(LSDVc)2, with the lagged dependent variable being used as an additional 
explanatory variable. The coefficients of the explanatory variables are very 
similar in both models. The results are summarised in Table 2. 
 
                                                          
1 Relative changes are approximated in the regression as the difference of the logarithmic values. 
The related regression coefficients can be interpreted as short-term elasticity. The coefficients 
for the absolute differences in demand structures can be interpreted as semi-elasticity.  
2 The corrected LSDV (LSDVc) is used to approximate and correct the Nickel bias that occurs 
in short-term dynamic panels.  
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The model assumes the following conditions for employment derived from an 
inverse production function: 
 ),log,log(log tttt structuredemandwyfE =   
The relationship is estimated in first differences and considers the adjustment 
of the lagged response of employment to economic growth. The following 
regressions are estimated: 
(I) static panel 
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Enlarged model, including additional squared GDP growth: 
(I) static panel 
 
t
t
ttttt y
cwyyyE ∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ − log)log(logloglog 21  
 
t
t
ttttt y
xwyyyE ∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ − log)log(logloglog 21  
 
(II) dynamic panel 
 
t
t
ttttt y
c
wyyEE ∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ − log)log(logloglog 21  
 
t
t
ttttt y
x
wyyEE ∆+∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ − log)log(logloglog 21  
 
Considering the determination of unemployment in this framework, the 
following long-term structure is assumed: 
),log,log,log( ttttt structuredemandwpopyfu =  
 
Like above, the regression equations are: 
(I) static panel 
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(II) dynamic panel 
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Table 2: Results of the panel regression equations for the EU15  
Determinants of employment 
Endogenous variable: Model (I) Model (II) Model (I) Model (II) 
Employment     
Exogenous variables:     
Employmentt-1  0.509**  0.542** 
  (11.39)  (11.56) 
Real GDP 0.444** 0.471** 0.461** 0.404** 
 (7.07) (11.06) (8.54) (9.32) 
Real GDPt-1 0.312**  0.348**  
 (7.43)  (7.20)  
Real wages -0.149** -0.076** -0.110** -0.083** 
 (-4.10) (-2.14) (-3.86) (-2.31) 
Private consumption ratio 0.292** 0.294**   
 (2.19) (3.19)   
Export ratio   -0.093** 0.003 
   (-2.29) (-0.20) 
Constant -1.275**  -1.212**  
 (-7.28)  (-5.68)  
R2 0.71  0.60  
Long-term elasticity of GDP 0.76 0.95 0.80 0.88 
Source: WIFO calculations 
t-statistics in parentheses. ** Indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. Model (I) is a static 
panel and was calculated by a fixed effects estimation method (LSDV). Model (II) is a dynamic 
panel and was estimated with the corrected LSDV. 
 
In the EU15 on average, the results of the estimations reveal high values 
for the short-term and the long-term elasticity3 of employment with respect to 
economic growth. At a constant rise in productivity - or one that balances out 
on the average of the countries – a rise in economic growth can be translated 
completely into a rise in employment. In accordance with the regression 
results, an additional increase in GDP by 1 per cent above trend, results in an 
average additional increase in employment across the EU countries by 0.7 per 
cent to 0.9 per cent  depending on the model. A study by the ECB (2004) on 
the development of employment in the Euro area reveals similarly high 
employment elasticity in a comparable panel regression. As illustrated by 
Table 2, the short-term marginal employment intensity of economic growth is 
around 0.5 per cent. With additional growth of 1 per cent of GDP in the EU 
countries, on average employment in these countries reacts by a rise of 0.5 per 
cent in the same year. The coefficients are higher here in the panel than in 
comparable estimates for Austria (see WIFO macro model).  
Compared to GDP, the development of real wages and that of the demand 
structure shows a relatively minor effect on employment (at given economic 
growth). The share of consumption in GDP has a significantly positive 
influence on employment trends in the two models, and an increase in the 
consumption ratio by 1 percentage point results in an average increase in 
employment of around 0.3 per cent throughout the EU countries. If the 
demand structure changes at constant economic output, and consumption is 
compensated by increased exporting activity, there is a negative effect on 
employment growth, although it is only slight. Due to the lower labour 
intensity of exports, consumption is on average more labour intensive than 
exports throughout the EU countries. The positive influence of additional 
exports (in contrast to a shift in demand aggregates) on growth (and 
subsequently on employment) does not flow into this regression analysis. For 
the sample studied, the coefficient of real wages is significantly negative in all 
models, albeit only slightly. On average, within the EU countries, a reduction 
in real wages of 1 per cent results in a rise in employment of 0.1 per cent. Any 
positive influence on GDP growth cannot be seen in the short-term results. 
                                                          
3 The long-term elasticity results in Model (I) from the sum of the short-term elasticity plus all 
significant lags. In Model (II) it results from the relationship between short-term elasticity and 1 
minus the co-efficient of delayed employment. 
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The positive income effect of higher wages (on consumption and thus on 
economic growth and subsequently on employment) is compensated by the 
cost-induced employment effect. Instead of real wages, an attempt was also 
made to integrate real unit labour costs – which have a relationship to 
productivity – as an exogenous variable into the model, but the explanatory 
content turned out to be insignificant.  
The influence of economic growth on employment is not necessarily linear, 
but can also have a concave form.  When economic growth is low, the reaction 
of employment is stronger – obviously due to the ample supply of labour on 
the market. At high growth rates, the reaction of employment flattens, because 
labour becomes scarcer making it harder for employment to increase. In this 
situation, productivity increases more steeply due to more overtime worked 
and heightened labour intensity. This effect is taken into account in the 
regression analysis by using squared GDP growth as an additional exogenous 
variable4. The negative coefficient confirms the concave form. Table 3 shows 
the results of the enlarged model. The average elasticity of GDP growth with 
respect to employment is higher in the enlarged model than the coefficients of 
GDP growth from the linear relationship. The further exogenous variables 
result in similar coefficients. 
Table 3: Results of the panel regression equations for the EU15 
Determinants of employment (enlarged model) 
Endogenous variable: Model (I) Model (II) Model (I) Model (II) 
Employment     
Exogenous variables:     
Employmentt-1  0.513**  0.552** 
  (11.59)  (11.95) 
Real GDP 0.674** 0.571** 0.601** 0.553** 
 (8.43) (9.10) (7.99) (8.43) 
Real GDPt-1 0.339**  0.364**  
 (9.26)  (8.61)  
Real wages -0.182** -0.088** -0.133** -0.095** 
 (-4.58) (-2.50) (-4.03) (-2.70) 
Private consumption ratio 0.192 0.251**   
 (1.55) (2.74)   
Export ratio   -0.049 0.022 
   (-1.89) (-0.52) 
GDP2 -0.036** -0.016** -0.024** -0.021** 
 (-4.33) (-2.11) (-2.82) (-2.70) 
Constant -1.511**  -1.330**  
 (-9.75)  (-7.05)  
R2 0.74  0.61  
Average elasticity  of GDP1 0.602 0.539 0.553 0.489 
Source: WIFO calculations 
t-statistics in parentheses.** Indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. Model (I) is a static 
panel and was calculated by a fixed effects estimation method (LSDV). Model (II) is a dynamic 
panel and was estimated with the corrected LSDV.1 Average of the elasticity measured at diverse 
points.  
 
In addition to the pace of economic growth, the development of the 
unemployment rate is influenced by the development of the supply of labour 
and policy measures aimed at the labour market (training, financial assistance, 
flexibility). For this reason, the relationship between economic growth and the 
development of the unemployment rate is not as close as that between growth 
and employment (see Figures 8 and 9). This is made clear by the results of the 
following investigation. 
Just like in the previous employment equation, the determinants for the 
change in the unemployment rate are analysed with the help of a static and a 
                                                          
4 A higher R2-value in the estimate supports the explanatory power of the additional variables 
but problems may arise due to multi-colinearity. However, in this case no significant correlation 
was found between the explanatory variables. A -test with a p-value of 0 clearly refuses the 
hypothesis that the variables together are not significantly different from 0.  
2Chi
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dynamic panel regression model - Model (I) and Model (II) – for the countries 
of the EU 15. Table 4 shows the results. The key explanatory variables are 
economic growth and the change in the working age population. If the latter 
increases by 1 per cent, then the average unemployment rate of the EU 
countries rises by around 0.7 percentage points. However, the causal 
relationship is not fully explained. Especially in the smaller European 
countries, migration may be the cause of repercussions from the situation on 
the labour market on demographic developments. The regression coefficients 
also show that economic growth has a high explanatory capacity for the 
development of unemployment rates. An increase in GDP by 1 per cent above 
trend results over the medium term, on the EU average, in a decline in the 
unemployment rate by 0.4 percentage point. Parallel to the results of the 
employment function, employment intensive consumption has a dampening 
effect on the unemployment rate; an increase in consumption by 1 percentage 
point leads to a decline in the unemployment rate of around 0.2 percentage 
points. The elasticity of the unemployment rate with respect to a change in the 
export share in GDP is positive, but negligibly small. Generally, structural 
variables influence changes in unemployment rates to a lesser extent than 
changes in employment rates. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that a change 
in real wages is only of minor significance for an explanation of 
unemployment. 
Table 4: Results of the panel regression equations for the EU15 
Determinants of unemployment  
Endogenous variable: Model (I) Model (I) Model (II) 
Unemployment rate    
Exogenous variables:    
Unemploymentt-1   0.475** 
   (-10.24) 
Real GDP -0.325** -0.319** -0.211** 
 (-8.11) (-7.91) (-9.27) 
Real GDPt-1 -0.168** -0.165**  
 (-4.45) (-4.60)  
Population 0.760** 0.839** 0.672** 
 (5.37) (5.78) (6.40) 
Real wages 0.029 0.049** 0.043 
 (1.35) (2.17) (1.79) 
Private consumption ratio -0.263**   
 (-2.99)   
Export ratio  0.072**  
  (3.25)  
Constant 0.852** 0.749**  
 (7.82) (7.03)  
R2 0.61 0.61  
Long-term elasticity  of GDP1 0.47 0.47 0.40 
Source: WIFO calculations 
t-statistics in parentheses.** Indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. Model (I) is a static 
panel and was calculated by a fixed effects estimation method (LSDV). Model (II) is a dynamic 
panel and was estimated with the corrected LSDV.  
2.5   PRODUCTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT 
The Lisbon strategy for more and better jobs aims at raising the growth and 
employment potential by increasing productivity and improving labour market 
performance. The targeted rise in the employment rate implies an increase in 
labour force participation and a reduction of unemployment. 
The great weakness of European employment programmes in the last 
decades was to solve the issue of unemployment by discouraging labour 
supply: by early retirement schemes, discouraging married women to work, 
reducing working hours and overtime (McMorrow–Pichelmann–Roeger, 
2005). This idea was overcome by the Lisbon strategy. It tried to close the gap 
in GDP per head between the EU and the US through supply side policies. 
GDP per capita at PPP in the EU-15 is about 70 per cent of the US level, two-
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thirds of this gap are due to lower labour input (hours worked and 
employment rates) and one-third is due to lower productivity per hour. The 
number of hours worked reveals the preference for income or leisure; higher 
productivity and higher employment rates are useful targets. 
There were mainly two criticisms to this strategy:  
- the supply-side potential must also be fully utilised, i.e., there needs to 
be sufficient demand and investment to turn the additional input of 
R&D, education and labour into additional output,  
- there may be a trade-off between employment and productivity since 
raising the employment rate will result in a larger number of workers 
per unit of capital. 
There are divergent developments of employment and productivity in the 
short and medium term, but there are few reasons for a long-term trade-off. 
Long-run technical progress is assumed to be neutral with respect to 
employment. Empirically, over long periods, the employment rate appears to 
be unrelated to productivity growth. In the short run, productivity and 
employment are often positively linked; both are picking up in a cyclical 
upswing and flattening in a downturn. 
In the period 1995 to 2005, there was a significant rise in the EU 
employment rate, but a slowdown in productivity increases. This slowdown in 
GDP per employed person may be explained by cyclical conditions (low 
capacity utilisation), lower investment (less capital deepening), strongly 
increasing part-time work and a rising low-wage sector (marketisation of 
household services, health/care services and paid internships). 
High growth periods are characterised by a shortage of skilled labour and 
by skill-upgrading. In low growth periods there is often a skill-downgrading, 
e.g., university graduates working in occupations and at salaries that do not 
reflect their educational level. Obviously, the utilisation of skills affects 
productivity developments. In low growth periods, there is a supply pressure 
on the labour market ending up in low wage jobs, paid internships, etc. There 
is, however, only limited empirical evidence to support this hypothesis for the 
last decades. 
In Annex 1 the relationship between productivity and employment is 
investigated. Whether or not there is a trade-off between employment and 
productivity is an essential question for the Lisbon process. In the EU there is 
a fairly uniform and significant short-run negative impulse on employment 
from a positive productivity shock. But according to the paper this effect 
becomes smaller and is in the long run statistically insignificant in most 
countries. In the long run, productivity and employment are not correlated. 
Also a paper by McMorrow–Pichelmann–Roeger (2005) dismisses the 
notion of a genuine trade-off between employment and productivity growth. 
Misguided policies exploiting such a trade-off have to be avoided: such as early 
retirement. 
Wage claims are clearly reacting to the unemployment rate, but there must 
be some empirical doubt on the extent of the unemployment reaction to a 
decline in real wage costs. Between 1995 and 2005 unemployment was rising in 
two EU countries: Germany and Austria. In these two countries alone, the 
reduction of unit labour costs was most pronounced amongst all EU countries. 
Wage moderation and labour shedding apparently led to an export boom in 
Germany and Austria, but restrained domestic demand at the same time. In the 
Netherlands, on the other hand, the strategy of wage moderation (“internal 
devaluation”) worked quite well, since rising housing wealth stimulated 
consumption. A strategy of wage moderation would be advisable in many of 
the Southern countries of the Euro area. These countries experienced a 
substantial loss in price competitiveness by relatively high increases in unit 
labour costs and prices during the last decade. Their key strategy to regaining 
price competitiveness is nominal wage moderation and enhancing productivity. 
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2.6   COUNTRY EXPERIENCES 
2.6.1: Italy: High Employment Increases with Low GDP Growth 
In Italy, the rise in employment and the decline in unemployment were much 
stronger than could be expected from economic developments. 
Macroeconomic performance was very weak, but the number of employed 
persons increased faster than in the Euro area and the unemployment rate 
dropped from 11 per cent to 7 per cent. 
These developments may be explained by several factors that are explored 
in Annex 2: 
- Immigrants who had worked illegally were admitted to the legal labour 
market. The increase in employment statistics is therefore 
overestimating labour market performance.  
- Labour market reforms in Italy helped to contain non-wage labour 
costs, to reduce the cost of searching and to match demand and 
supply. Two important reforms radically changed the Italian labour 
market: the Treu package in 1997 and the Biagi law in 2003. 
- Labour cost moderation was concentrated particularly on new 
employment contracts for the young. Temporary contracts for young 
people sharply increased (from about 30 per cent in 2000 to 40 per 
cent in 2006), but unlike in Spain not for all employees. Despite more 
moderate wage increases, Italy's relative unit labour cost position 
further deteriorated. 
- Part-time employment played an important role in increasing the 
participation rate of women. Female part-time work increased from 
20.9 per cent in 1993 to 25.6 per cent in 2005. 
In Italy, the employment content of growth has increased dramatically since 
the 1990s. There is econometric evidence of a structural break in the 1990s; 
real wages have a significant negative effect on employment only since 1997.  
But the other side of the coin is that productivity (output per employed 
person) stagnated. Increasing the employment content of growth may be a 
good strategy for a slackening economy. But a stagnation of productivity 
cannot be a long-run goal and is not a sustainable long-term strategy. There is 
no doubt that the reduction of unemployment in Italy did not lead to higher 
economic growth, but to a stagnation of productivity.  
The large increase in low-wage jobs (paid internships) for well-educated 
young people in Italy and Spain was alleviated by the "Mediterranean Model" 
where the family plays a big role and young people remain within their parent’s 
household for longer.  
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Figure 12:  Productivity and employment growth
Percent p.a.
Source: WIFO calculations
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2.6.2:  Part-time Employment in the Netherlands 
The high rate of part-time employment is a striking feature of the Dutch 
labour market which is analysed in Annex 4. In particular women with children 
work substantially less than standard full-time hours, while a substantial 
fraction of men with children work fewer than full-time hours also. Many 
women choose to work two or three days per week, while most men work full-
time and some men work four days (=32 hours) per week. 
As part-time employment started to increase before the introduction of 
laws to reinforce the position of part-time workers, it is likely that policy 
followed the preferences within Dutch society (and did not cause the growth 
of part-time employment). Part-time employment has contributed to the 
combination of  work and family life, and therefore has facilitated the growth 
of female labour force participation. The impact of part-time working on the 
growth of the production capacity of the Dutch economy is, however, unclear 
as full-time workers may have been induced to work part time. 
Part-time employment clearly has advantages. First, it offers opportunities 
to balance work and other (family and care) responsibilities. Second, part-time 
workers may form a flexible pool that allow firms to adjust more easily to the 
business cycle by adjusting working hours in the desired direction. Higher 
utilisation of employees raises firms' profits. Moreover, firms do not pay 
overtime premia for extra hours of part-time workers. 
The contribution of part-time employment to the emancipation of women 
is unclear. On the one hand, it may facilitate female labour force participation, 
so that their human capital does not erode. This opens possibilities to re-
entering into full-time employment once the children have been raised. 
Currently this is not common practice, but behaviour may change in the 
future. On the other hand, part-time employment nevertheless slows down 
investment in human capital, simply due to less work experience. And this may 
have a negative impact on women’s careers. . 
The Dutch government assisted the preference towards part-time work. In 
1993, the Dutch government reinforced the legal position of part-time workers 
by regulating the statutory minimum wage and the minimum holiday 
allowance. Previously, these rights did not apply to employees working less 
than one-third of normal full-time hours. In 1996, the government passed a 
law that gave part-time workers an explicit right to equal treatment – pro rata – 
on wages, overtime payments, bonuses and training. In 2000, the government 
even awarded workers the right to request an upward or downward adjustment 
to the number of working hours within their current job, which employers 
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have to honour unless there are conflicting business interests. The Dutch tax 
system does not contain an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) or other tax 
credits and subsidies that may make part-time employment particularly 
attractive. 
2.6.3  Employment and Unemployment Thresholds: the Example 
of Austria 
Growth must surpass a certain threshold before employment starts to rise and 
unemployment starts to decline. These threshold values can only serve to a 
limited extent as economic policy indicators, however. They do not constitute 
a constant measure, as they change over the long term – due to technological 
progress and developments in the institutional framework on the labour 
market – as well as over the business cycle.  
These thresholds are determined for Austria based on time series and a 
regression analysis. The employment threshold is defined as that rate of 
economic growth that is necessary to keep employment (or the volume of 
labour) constant. Analogously, the unemployment threshold refers to the 
critical growth rate at which the unemployment rate remains unchanged. This 
concept is very popular, but also controversial because thresholds are not fixed 
measures, but fluctuate over time. In the course of the business cycle, they vary 
over the short term with the degree of capacity utilisation. At rising capacity 
utilisation, productivity increases, raising the employment threshold. In times 
of recession, the employment threshold is much lower. Long-term structural 
changes in the economy (e.g., sectoral structural changes or a change in capital 
intensity) may lead to systemic changes in employment thresholds. Critics of 
the concept furthermore point out that the threshold values could be lowered 
by a flexibility of the labour market (or by shortening working hours). 
Therefore, past developments are hardly indicative of future trends. 
The empirical determination of the employment threshold is based on 
Verdoorn’s Law, which establishes a linear relationship between productivity and 
economic growth5. Employment is able to rise in an economy only if overall 
economic production increases at a faster rate than labour productivity. Here, 
it is calculated as the growth of real GDP per person in active dependent 
employment and supplies a guideline for the employment threshold. The steep 
increase in employment since 2000 has slowed the pace of labour productivity 
over the time series. The rise in active dependent employment was influenced 
strongly by the increase in part-time employment. For this reason, a 
conversion of labour productivity into full-time equivalents is more indicative. 
The time series show that the increase in productivity is subject to cyclical, 
seasonal and irregular fluctuations. In order to derive information for the 
determination of the employment threshold, a filter was used to eliminate all 
high frequency fluctuations from the times series and a smooth non-linear 
trend was defined. The setting usually applied for quarterly values (λ = 1600) is 
selected for the HP filter so as to remove all oscillations with a duration of less 
than 32 quarters. 
This time series analysis for Austria results in a relatively stable medium-
term employment threshold measured in full-time equivalents of almost 2 per 
cent. This level applies to periods of economic growth of a solid 2 per cent. 
(At a growth trend of 3 per cent or 1 per cent, the threshold value is 
accordingly higher or lower.) As a consequence of the steep rise in part-time 
employment, the threshold for employment (not converted into full-time) is 
                                                          
5 Verdoorn’s Law states that productivity growth depends linearly on economic growth. The 
increase in productivity results from the difference in the growth rates of production and 
employment. Thus, a linear relationship exists between economic and employment growth. This 
can be analysed by applying the regression approach in order to make a statement on the 
threshold value. However, the law requires production growth to correspond to that of capital. 
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substantially lower (around 1½ per cent). However, this level is of minor 
relevance, because it has little to do with labour volumes. 
Additionally, the employment threshold for the period investigated from 
1995 to 2005 was also determined using a regression model. The average GDP 
growth rate was 2.2 per cent during this period. This approach yields a similar 
result as the time series analysed above at a growth trend of around 2 per cent. 
A least square regression analysis was conducted to estimate the change in 
active dependent employment (in full-time equivalents) in response to 
economic growth and a constant. To obtain the employment threshold from 
the results of the estimates, the rise in employment is set to zero and the 
threshold value results from the ratio of the coefficients -α/β with 1.9. 
However, a R2 of 0.4 indicates the small explanatory content of the exogenous 
variables. 
The two methods result in an employment threshold of almost 2 per cent 
in full-time equivalents. This applies to an economic growth rate of a solid 2 
per cent over the medium term. At this growth rate, the unemployment 
threshold in Austria is almost 2.5 per cent over the medium term. It is 
composed of the employment threshold and the increase in the supply of 
labour, which has been around ½ per cent in the past few years. 
In conclusion it is possible to calculate stable figures for the employment 
threshold for the short to medium term for Austria. It is around 2 per cent 
(full-time equivalent). For economic policy considerations, it is important to 
recognise that the employment threshold follows the productivity growth of 
labour. Rising productivity is generally viewed as an important driver of higher 
economic growth and the aim is to support productivity. However, at the same 
time this means that it will become more difficult to turn higher growth into 
employment.  
Table 5: Employment and unemployment thresholds for Austria per cent 
 Employment  
threshold1
Employment 
threshold1 
(full-time 
equivalent) 
Unemployment 
threshold1
Real GDP 
growth 
1995-2000 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.6 
2000-2005 1.4 1.8 2.2 1.8 
1995-2005 1.7 2.0 2.4 2.2 
Source: WIFO calculations. 
1At a real GDP growth of … per cent employment starts to increase and unemployment to 
decline. 
 
 Unemployment rates of unskilled and low-wage workers have been high in 
many Euro area countries. Therefore, special strategies were developed to 
reduce unemployment of these groups. In a nutshell most continental 
countries primarily tried to reduce the firms' labour costs for low-wage jobs 
(e.g. by cuts in social security contributions, One-Euro-jobs etc.). The Anglo-
American countries gave the unemployed an incentive to work (through 
earned income tax credits), and the Scandinavian countries successfully 
implemented activation strategies on the principle of mutual obligations (case 
management etc.). 
3.  
Low-wage 
Sector Strategies 
There is another long-run option to reduce the number of unskilled 
unemployed which is not given adequate attention by policy makers: investing 
in human capital by keeping children in the educational system so that they can 
complete high school and preferably go on to third level. While this cannot 
address the problem of unemployment in the short run, it will better match 
demand and supply in the long run. In a world where skills are becoming 
increasingly important, educational systems play an essential role in equalising 
and raising opportunities (OECD, 2007). 
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3.1   LOW-SKILLED JOBS: THE FRENCH STRATEGY 
The French economy has been unable to tackle mass unemployment since 
1974. During the last decade, the unemployment rate fell only in a few 
episodes below 9 per cent. Unemployment of unskilled workers has been very 
high. In a situation of high unemployment, graduate workers apply for jobs for 
which they are over skilled. Having the choice, companies hire them, and non-
graduates do not find jobs. In this context, the priority is not to increase 
unskilled labour supply, which is rising anyway through immigration. A tighter 
labour market could improve the situation of the unskilled. 
Unskilled jobs are threatened by competition from low-wage emerging 
countries. In this respect, the French situation – explored in Annex 4 - is not 
different to other EU countries. The minimum wage and the minimum income 
prevent the wages of the unskilled to fall sufficiently to clear the market. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Minimum wages in Europe and in the US 
 2005 
Minimum wages 
2004 Employees at the 
minimum wage level 
 € Per cent of average 
workers’ wage 
Per cent of total 
employees 
Luxembourg 1,467 43.5 18.0 
Netherlands 1,265 40.2 2.1 
Belgium 1,210 39.9 n.a. 
UK 1,197 50.3 1.4 
France 1,197 47.5 15.6 
Ireland 1,183 44.8 3.1 
Greece 668 43.8 n.a. 
US 666 25.2 1.4 
Spain 599 29.8 0.8 
Czech Republic 240 38.7 2.0 
Hungary 232 38.9 8.0 
Poland 205 33.0 4.5 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
There are a number of reasons for a specific strategy for unskilled workers: 
- the effect of globalisation on the relative position of unskilled workers; 
- relatively high minimum wages (SMIC) in France; 
- the minimum income (RMI) narrows the gap between wages and 
insurance benefits for unskilled workers, thus they can fall into an 
“inactivity trap”; 
- targeted measures are less costly. 
Specific strategies in France to reduce unemployment of low-wage workers 
were:  
- cuts in social security contributions to lower the cost of hiring 
unskilled workers for companies; 
- working tax credit (“prime pour emploi”) to increase the gap between 
wage income and benefits; 
- control of minimum wages. 
Social security contribution cuts on low wages cost about 1 per cent of 
GDP. They are often questioned, because they are expensive and their effect 
on employment is difficult to assess. The estimated effect varies enormously 
between the available studies. Using an average estimate, the measure costs 
€15,000 per created job which is quite a lot. Above all, they give an incentive 
for companies to create special low-wage jobs without prospects in terms of 
promotion. With the rising educational attainment of young people, the 
promotion of a large low-wage sector is questionable.  
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According to the “Cour des comptes report”: 
- Social security cuts are not very useful in manufacturing where the 
priority would be to develop high-value added activities rather than 
protect low-wage sectors. 
- These cuts have hardly an impact on job creation in department 
stores, while allowing them to increase their margins. 
- In the hotel-cafe-restaurant sector, social security cuts would have 
been an incentive for companies to create more low-paid jobs without 
an impact on total employment. 
It appears that cuts in social security contributions for the low-skilled and 
low-wage jobs are costly, particularly in countries with rather equal income 
distribution. But once adopted, such measures can hardly be eliminated 
without substantial negative effects on employment.  
3.2   LOW-WAGE EMPLOYMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS 
Like most EU countries the Netherlands are confronted with a high rate of 
unemployment and non-participation among low-skilled workers. Whereas the 
participation rate of individuals with primary education roughly equals 50 per 
cent and with lower secondary education it is about 75 per cent, these rates are 
roughly 80 per cent for individuals with higher secondary education and 90 per 
cent for higher educated people. 
Several causes can be designated to the relatively high non-participation and 
unemployment rates of the low skilled. The first possibility is that there is a 
quality mismatch between the supply and demand for labour. Another 
possibility is that a low-wage workers’ productivity is too low relative to the 
minimum wage the employer has to pay, the so-called productivity trap. A 
third possibility arises from the poverty trap. In this case, accepting a job does 
not improve an individuals’ net income and therefore the unemployed are 
reluctant to apply for a job. Above all, bad working conditions for low-skilled 
workers may deter people from participating in the labour market; such jobs 
are left to the immigrants. 
Raising the employment rate of low-skilled workers is also important from 
a fiscal perspective: it raises the tax base and lowers welfare expenditures. 
Several studies also stress the social benefits of a paid job for the individuals 
themselves.  
Since the mid-1990s, various policy measures targeted at the low skilled 
have been intensified (see Annex 5). These policies can be divided into policies 
that stimulate participation and job creation on the one hand (carrots), and 
policies that discourage non-participation on the other hand (sticks). Carrots 
give positive incentives, but they cost money. Sticks give negative incentives 
and bring in money. 
The rise and persistence of long-term unemployment in the last decades has 
persuaded the Dutch government to increase expenditures on subsidised 
employment sharply during the mid-1990s. Recently, the focus has changed 
from policies that stimulate participation (“carrots”) to those that discourage 
receiving benefits (“sticks”). For example, wage costs subsidies and relief jobs 
have been largely phased out. This is partly compensated by intensifying the 
(basically flat) earned income tax credit. 
On the other hand, the Dutch government implemented various policy 
measures that deter benefit claimants from applying for a benefit and stimulate 
them to look for a job. Examples of these policies are the reduction in the 
maximum duration of unemployment insurance benefits, the freeze of the 
minimum wage (2003-2005) and the considerable tightening of the admission 
criteria for social assistance, unemployment and disability benefits.  
According to the CGE model for the Netherlands, the reduction of 
benefits (sticks) is one of the best ways to increase the labour supply and 
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reduce unemployment. This is also a central feature of the Hartz reforms.  Not 
only from a social, but  also from an economic point of view, there is a certain 
limit to a substantial reduction of unemployment benefits. Emigration of the 
unemployed (e.g. from Germany to Austria) reduces the potential labour 
supply. 
3.3 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE GERMAN LABOUR MARKET 
(HARTZ-) REFORMS AND FIRST RESULTS OF EVALUATION 
Chronology of the Reforms 
The persistent high unemployment rate in Germany stimulated discussion 
about a more efficient labour market service and led in 2002 to the 
establishment of the Hartz-Commission. The Commission comprised 
enterprises, unions, craft associations, politicians, but no economists were 
members. 
After an intensive discussion, the so-called Hartz reforms were 
implemented in four steps between January 2003 and January 2005. Hartz IV is 
usually considered as the key reform of the labour market. The following are 
the most important elements of the Hartz reforms: 
 
Hartz I (2003)  
• Mandated registration even for impending unemployment. 
• Stricter rules to accept ‘reasonable’ employment. 
• In case of a rejected job offer, the burden of proof now rests with the 
job seeker (possible benefit reduction). 
• More efficient training and programmes targeted at the elderly (in case 
of new contracts above age 55 no contributions to unemployment 
insurance, longer temporary contracts allowed). 
• Personal Service Agencies (PSA) to ‘vitalise’ job placements. 
 
Hartz II (2003) 
 
• Job centres instead of unemployment offices: both unemployed 
workers and social welfare recipients should have a common point of 
contact. 
• Introduction of the ‘Ich-AG’ (‘I Inc.’) start-up assistance. 
• Mini jobs – changed additional earnings limits for transfer recipients. 
• Government sponsoring of household-related services. 
 
Hartz III (2004: minor changes) 
 
• Merging and renaming of different labour market programmes (ABM 
and SAM) and services and stronger focus on the future reintegration 
prospects of the unemployed. 
• Short-time work transfers paid to employers during restructuring 
programmes. 
• Uniform entitlement to unemployment assistance (abolishment of 
special entitlements e.g. for seasonal workers). 
 
Hartz IV – the key reform (2005) 
 
• Merging of long-term unemployment assistance with social welfare 
transfers – thereby inclusion of fit-to-work individuals previously not 
registered as unemployed. 
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• Provision of public utility jobs for fit-to-work transfer recipients 
(‘One-Euro Jobs’ – transfers plus one Euro per hour worked). 
• Further tightening of ‘reasonableness’ clause (sub-union wages and 
standard regional wages must now be accepted; otherwise transfers 
might be cut). 
• Introduction of ‘entry assistance’ as a financial incentive to take up 
employment. 
Main results of the first evaluations concerning the effectiveness 
of the Hartz-reforms6
The results of the first extensive evaluations are: 
• The new forms and organisation of occupational or vocational training 
contributed to faster and in terms of numbers higher job success. This 
was not merely as a result of a more intensive choice of participants 
but of a higher quality of training. 
• The new, more generous ‘entry assistance’ was efficient especially for 
older – up to then unemployed – women in East Germany. Three 
years after the first use of this assistance, the share of persons 
employed in jobs with social insurance obligation was 19 to 42 per 
cent higher than in comparable, not assisted groups. 
• ‘Start-up assistance’ for newly created small enterprises or self-
employment proved to be successful,  though subsequently some of 
these jobs were lost. More than 1 million participants took part in the 
‘Ich-AG’ (I-inc.). 
• The reform of the ‘mini-job model’ led to the creation of additional 
(about one and a half million) mini-jobs. But there are signs, that many 
of these mini-jobs were created by giving up or avoiding full-time jobs, 
thus avoiding the payment of otherwise high social insurance 
contributions.  
To sum up: 
The reform of the organisational structure of the Federal Labour Agency 
(BA) showed initial success. The focus shifted from social to labour policy. 
Whereas previous negative assessments of job creation programmes were 
confirmed, integration assistance was used more efficiently than in the past. 
Better occupational training as well as the ‘Start-up’ assistance proved to be 
most efficient. 
Certainly, current results of evaluations are preliminary, but there is visible 
progress. As long as there was low growth and thus not enough new jobs in 
Germany, putting pressure on the unemployed could not always lead to 
acceptable employment. It is true that up to now not many additional jobs 
have been created by the Hartz measures, but the positive sides of the reform 
may result in a longer upswing, the flexibility and the potential of the labour 
market certainly have increased and this will help to avoid bottlenecks.  
 
What will remain from the reforms in the longer run?  
• Unemployment assistance has been cut down to the level of welfare 
payments, thus trying to minimise undesired incentives to stay 
unemployed. 
6 Cf. e.g. Hartz: Bilanz der Arbeitsmarkt- und Beschäftigungspolitik. In: Bruno Kaltenborn (ed.), 
Blickpunkt Arbeit und Wirtschaft 12/2006; DIW Berlin, IZA, Infas: Evaluation der Maßnahmen 
zur Umsetzung der Vorschläge der Hartz-Kommission, Bericht 2006 für das Bundesministerium 
für Arbeit und Soziales, Juni 2006; Marco Caliendo und Viktor Steiner, Ich-AG und 
Überbrückungsgeld – Neue Ergebnisse bestätigen Erfolg. In: Wochenbericht des DIW Berlin 
No. 3/2007.  
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• Reduction of transfer payments to 12 months (18 months for 
elderly). 
• Public employment programmes will no longer lead to a renewed 
eligibility for unemployment compensation.  
• Work requirement for recipients of unemployment aid. 
• Elimination of most rules for ‘reasonableness’ of job offers for 
recipients of unemployment aid. 
3.4  THE EFFECT OF EMPLOYMENT SUBSIDIES 
The impact of employment subsidies and vouchers is analysed in two papers 
attached in Annex 6. In many OECD countries, the relative position of 
employees at the bottom of the wage distribution has deteriorated over the 
past decade. Whereas in the US this worsening has taken the form of lower 
relative real wages, in a number of continental European countries the 
deterioration appears in higher relative unemployment rates for unskilled 
people. Confronted with these problems, policy makers have been searching 
for labour market instruments to reduce unemployment while avoiding large 
disparities in income. A popular tool are low-wage subsidies which have been 
widely advocated, e.g. by Phelps. 
The central policy problem posed by unskilled workers is that they are 
associated to low wages or low employment opportunities or both. Raising 
their wages would reduce firm’s demand for them, while lowering their wages 
would be socially unacceptable. Low wage subsidies response to this policy 
problem drives a wedge between the income these workers receive and their 
labour costs. These subsidies, in various guises, have been implemented in 
various countries, including France (PPE and social contribution cuts), 
Germany (Kombilohn), Great Britain (Working Families Tax Credits) and the 
United States (Earned Income Tax Credit). 
The existing literature on the effects of low-wage subsidies has tended to 
ignore their impact on skill formation. Thus, a possible negative effect on the 
incentives to acquire human capital and thereby on skilled employment is not 
taken into account. Therefore, it is commonly supposed that since low-wage 
subsidies reduce the labour cost of low-wage workers, they must stimulate 
aggregate employment. The paper in Annex 6 calls this presumption into 
question. 
According to the Annex paper, low-wage subsidies have three important 
effects:  
- they promote employment of unskilled workers who tend to be the 
ones who earn low wages; 
- they reduce the incentive to become skilled by raising the pay-off of 
unskilled work relative to skilled work, so that there are more unskilled 
workers associated with a relatively low employment rate. (However, 
workers acquire qualifications on the job; therefore it is useful to get 
them on the job. Moreover, the effects of wage subsidies on the 
returns to education are likely to be small as they only apply to those at 
the bottom of the distribution.) 
- the government budget constraint has to be taken into account, which 
is supposed to cause an additional tax burden for the skilled. This 
amplifies the negative effect of low-wage subsidies to acquire human 
capital. 
The first effect on the one hand and the second and third effect on the 
other hand pull in opposite directions in terms of employment. The analysis 
comes to the conclusion that low wage subsidies do not raise employment in 
total, since the negative skill acquisition effect and the budget effect are higher 
than the positive direct employment effect. 
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In another paper of Annex 6 the effectiveness of alternative types of 
employment subsidies is analysed. The paper proposes a new criterion for the 
evaluation of employment subsidies: approximately welfare-efficient policies, 
i.e. policies that: 
- improve employment and welfare; 
- do not raise earnings inequality; and 
- are self-financing.  
The result is a subsidy ranking: hiring vouchers targeted at the long-term 
unemployed seem to be a useful instrument. They can be welfare efficient in 
the above sense. Hiring vouchers targeted at the long-term unemployed are 
more effective than targeted at low-income workers. The less skilled the 
targeted workers are and the longer they have been unemployed, the more 
effective are the hiring vouchers.  
 
 
4.1  EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 4. 
 Immigration 
and the Labour 
Market 
The past few years have seen a growing debate on the question of migration. 
There has been a sharp inflow of migrants into the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Spain and Austria, raising a range of economic and social issues. 
The immigration flows associated with EU enlargement are likely to be 
relatively small for most countries. Nevertheless, as illustrated here, there 
should be noticeable impacts in individual countries. Amongst the NMS the 
poorest and smallest economies appear to have experienced the largest 
population shocks. The concentration of recent NMS emigration in the 
English speaking economies suggests that there are likely to be noticeable 
impacts there as well. However, in comparison to the immigration that 
normally occurs from countries outside the EU, the migration associated with 
the enlargement of the EU in May 2004 has so far proved modest. We have 
already noted that the UK and Italy experienced substantial increases in net 
immigration in recent years. Other EU countries, not considered here, have 
experienced similar sharp increases in migration flows in the recent past 
including Spain where the annual inflow of foreign nationals has steadily 
increased from 99 thousand in 1999 to 646 thousand in 2004 (OECD, 2006B). 
The NIGEM simulations suggest that the effect of a net increase in Polish 
emigration of around ⅓ million people of working age is to reduce output 
permanently by around 1 per cent. The reduction in output comes as a result 
of having fewer workers, but the reduction is not one for one. This is due to 
the assumption that the capital stock does not fully adjust, leaving the capital-
labour ratio permanently higher. In the longer term, business sector capital 
adjusts downward to match the decline in the labour force. However, public 
infrastructures (such as transport) and the housing stock are assumed not to 
adjust fully over the time period shown. Both public and housing capital enter 
the production function and, since these do not adjust fully, productivity in 
Poland is permanently higher by around ⅓ per cent. Qualitatively the effects 
on output and productivity are similar for the other NMS countries, with more 
noticeable effects in Lithuania and Latvia where particularly large migrations 
have been observed.  
In Ireland and the UK the reverse pattern is observed. The increase in the 
labour force raises potential output, and in the longer term output rises to 
match this increase. As in the case of Poland, described above, the match is 
not one for one, since productivity changes. In Ireland and the UK 
productivity falls as public sector infrastructure and the housing stock are 
assumed not to adjust fully, failing to rise to maintain the ratio of capital to 
labour. Intuitively this assumption seems more restrictive for the receiving 
countries than for the sending countries, for which it seems reasonable to 
assume that emigration would not lead to an immediate dismantling of public 
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infrastructure. If it were to adjust the effects on GDP would be larger in the 
EU-15 countries than our simulations suggest, and productivity would be less 
depressed. In the longer term these calculations imply that output in the UK is 
⅔ per cent higher than it would otherwise be. In Ireland output is higher by 
1.7 per cent reflecting mainly the bigger size of the migration shock. 
Unanticipated immigration of people of working age increases the supply 
of labour without any corresponding increase in the stock of capital. The 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem implies that, with labour becoming more 
abundant, wages should be expected to fall and the return on capital to rise. 
This analysis assumes that all labour is employed and that wages adjust to clear 
the market. If wages are sticky downward, due to minimum wages or collective 
agreements, then an increase in the labour force may well lead to an increase in 
unemployment. Immigrants may keep indigenous workers out of jobs. There is 
a good reason why an inflow of young workers in low-skill occupations  would 
be likely to add to unemployment instead of resulting in a fall in pay rates. In 
these occupations in particular, the minimum wage sets a floor to the wage 
level. 
Simulations with NIGEM for the UK suggest that a gradual rise in the 
labour force of ¾ per cent over 2-3 years leads to a temporary increase in 
unemployment of ¼ percentage point for a  few years, with the unemployment 
gradually disappearing as wages adjust according to the forward looking 
assumptions of the model (see Annex 7). Over the longer term GDP per 
capita is increased, since the increase in the labour force is more than the 
percentage increase in the total population. 
Another example of these trends can be found in Austria (see Annex 8). In 
the early 1990s, the inflow of foreign workers was fully liberalised in Austria 
for almost two years since there was a labour shortage after German 
reunification. There was an inflow of more than 100,000 foreign workers 
within a short period of time. Simulations suggest that, on balance, 70 per cent 
of the additional foreign workers increased employment and 30 per cent added 
to unemployment. Young foreign workers partly replaced older foreign and 
indigenous workers.  
The very high inflow of foreign labour in these years of liberalisation came 
as a kind of shock; it was partly supply-driven. In the 1970s, on the other hand, 
the large inflow of foreign workers to Austria was mainly demand-driven, i.e. 
they got work permits only if no unemployed were available for the job. In this 
case there was no substitution effect and no increase in unemployment. 
Since 1990, family reunification (an echo effect of earlier labour migration) 
and immigration on humanitarian grounds have taken precedence over labour 
migration in Austria. Immigrants are to a large extent un- and semiskilled, not 
much different from those of the first generation migrants. In recent years, 
despite the comparatively small inflow of workers from the new member 
states, the Austrian labour market could not fully absorb the rapid increase in 
foreign labour supply. Following the end of the transition agreements, Austria 
will face a large inflow from the new member states, particularly commuters. 
The distance between Bratislava and Vienna is only 65 kilometers. In recent 
years, despite the legal restrictions the flows of migrants from neighbouring 
countries to Austria was about as high as in the UK, as a percentage of the 
population, and much higher than in Sweden.  
4.2   IMMIGRATION IN IRELAND 
Ireland’s exceptional economic growth in recent years has led to an influx of 
immigrants. Ireland is unusual in terms of the speed with which the non-
national percentage of its population has risen. In the 2002 Census, 7 per cent 
of the population was found to be non-nationals. In the 2006 Census, the 
corresponding figure was 10 per cent. The immigrants arrived in response to 
the economic growth of the “Celtic tiger” era. 
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A second unusual dimension of Ireland’s migration experience is the speed 
with which it turned from being a country of out-migration to being a country 
of in-migration. As recently as the early 1990s Ireland was experiencing a net 
outflow. As the population at the time was only 3.5 million, the outflow in 
1988 and 1989 represented over 1 per cent of the population; this was high by 
international standards. 
A third unique feature of immigration into Ireland has been the high levels 
of education among the immigrants. Immigrants in Ireland have notably higher 
levels of education than the domestic population. Of the immigrant population 
in Ireland 85 per cent who arrived between 1993 and 2003 are high skilled (at 
least secondary level) compared with 67 per cent of the native population. This 
is in contrast to the experience, for example, in the US and most EU countries 
where immigrants are generally less skilled than the native population. Though 
immigrants in Ireland are a highly educated group they are not all employed in 
occupations that fully reflect their education levels.  
Immigrants increased GDP by lowering skilled wages, overcoming 
shortages and improving Ireland’s competitiveness. The paper attached in 
Annex 9 highlights the positive role of skilled immigration, but touches also 
the problems with unskilled immigration: An immigrant flow that is largely 
unskilled would increase GDP, but the impact on unskilled workers would be 
very negative: falling wages and higher unemployment of unskilled workers as 
well as falling GDP per head. From a policy perspective, the lesson is that 
policy should aim at promoting the inflow of skilled workers. But there is no 
guarantee that the inflow will continue to be high skilled, particularly with 
respect to the inflow from new EU member countries. 
Given the favourable economic climate into which Ireland’s immigrants are 
arriving, it is interesting to ask how their earnings and welfare dependence 
compare with the native population. To the extent that strong economic 
growth produces good labour market opportunities for immigrants, earnings 
disadvantages may be lessened and any tendency towards welfare dependence 
may be reduced. Data from a nationally representative sample drawn in 2004 
are used to assess the earnings of immigrants in Ireland relative to the native 
population and also the rate of welfare receipt across the two groups. 
Immigrants are found to earn 18 per cent less than natives, controlling for 
education and years of work experience. However, this single figure hides 
differences across immigrants from English-speaking and non-English 
speaking countries. The ESRI study also finds evidence of a wage gap for 
immigrants with third-level education, relative to comparable natives. On 
average, immigrants are half as likely to have been in receipt of social welfare 
payments in the previous twelve months relative to natives. A difference in 
welfare participation remains when it is controlled for the higher education 
attainment of immigrants.  
 
 
- During the last decades, GDP growth had a highly significant effect 
on employment and unemployment. Thus it may be expected, that the 
Lisbon strategies to increase economic growth (R&D, education, etc.) 
will also help to reduce unemployment, together with necessary labour 
market reforms.  
5.  
Policy 
Conclusions 
- Labour market institutions play a crucial role in explaining the 
differences in unemployment rates across countries, but not per se 
over time (Blanchard, 2005). However, the interaction of the 
institutional framework with macroeconomic shocks is important. 
Labour market reforms may remove barriers to employment (IfW 
et al., 2002) and raise the level of production that can be achieved 
without inflationary pressures. Changes in labour market institutions 
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will be important for the future development of structural 
unemployment in many EU countries. 
- Increasing the employment intensity of growth (by reducing the 
capital-labour ratio etc.) cannot be considered as a useful long-run 
strategy since it is the “flig-side of poor productivity growth” 
(Kroeger, 2005). This cannot be the aim of long-run policy, but only a 
short-run remedy in hard economic times. Nevertheless, reforms in 
the financing of the social security systems can lower labour costs, and 
temporary employment-intensive growth can be welfare enhancing if it 
reduces structural unemployment.  
- According to the Lisbon strategy no long-run trade-off between 
productivity and employment should be observed. In the long run 
there appears to be no such trade-off in most EU countries. But 
during the last decade, the substantial increase in employment rates 
did not result in higher GDP growth, as widely expected, since it was 
matched by smaller productivity increases. These two opposite trends 
reflect higher labour market flexibility (rise in part-time work, 
increasing importance of the low wage and productivity segment). In 
this regard, the opposite forces seem to be only of temporary 
relevance. 
- The increase in part-time employment was a major factor in raising the 
employment rate, particularly in the Netherlands. Part-time work 
eased the combination of paid work and family obligations. The rise in 
female employment entailed a further increase of jobs through 
marketisation of household work. However, the stagnation of full-time 
jobs in the Euro area since 2000 has impeded the integration of the 
unemployed; the majority of them are looking for full-time jobs.  
- Reducing the labour supply (by early retirement etc.) is not an 
appropriate instrument to tackle unemployment since shortages of 
qualified labour will arise during a cyclical upswing and also due to 
unfavourable demographic trends. Curtailing incentives for early 
retirement contributed to higher participation rates of older people. 
Nevertheless, participation rates of the elderly are still low in many 
countries. An increase in labour supply will normally be absorbed by 
the labour market, thus increasing economic growth and employment. 
But with lack of demand or an “overshooting” supply shock (e.g. 
through immigration) there is a risk of rising unemployment since the 
wages of the unskilled are sticky downward. While the effect of an 
“immigration shock” on unemployment will cancel out if wages react, 
the impact on the income distribution will remain. During the last 
decade, the development of the working-age population had a 
significant effect on unemployment. The decline in the working-age 
population in the next decade will thus help to reduce unemployment. 
- Wage moderation for new entrants, in particular the young, helped to 
reduce unemployment in the Mediterranean countries (Italy and 
Spain), where the family still  provides  an important safety net. But 
the increase in low-wage employment of young people was at the cost 
of productivity. Wage moderation could not stop the increase of 
unemployment in Germany and Austria where the induced export 
boom was counteracted by weak domestic demand. 
- In many countries, relatively strong employment protection and 
bargained wages for permanent employees and very flexible temporary 
contracts for the young led to a dual labour market.   
- Cuts in social insurance contributions, as widely used in France, are a 
costly instrument to reduce unemployment. But once introduced such 
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measures can hardly be eliminated without a negative employment 
shock.  
- Activation of the unemployed as practiced in the Nordic countries 
(mutual obligations) has proved to be a useful instrument in reducing 
unemployment. Labour market policies and unemployment benefits 
should be designed in a way that does not trap people into inactivity.   
- Vouchers targeted at the unemployed are a cost-efficient instrument to 
reduce unemployment, in particular to improve the competitiveness of 
the unemployed vis-à-vis other groups (new immigrants etc.). Such 
vouchers seem to be a useful but not undisputed instrument.  
- Besides an adequate macroeconomic strategy, low replacement rates 
and a minimum wage "to make work pay" helped to reduce 
unemployment in the United Kingdom and Ireland, but at the risk of 
poverty. In these countries, a relatively high share of the working-age 
population is living on welfare payments. High replacement rates do 
not necessarily result in high unemployment since the unemployed 
have no right to choose. But relatively high replacement rates need to 
be supplemented by pressure on the unemployed to accept jobs (e.g., 
activation strategies in the Scandinavian countries). 
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